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94-8729 BENNIS v. MICHIGAN
Nuisance abatement-Forfeiture-Due process.
Ruling below (Mich SupCt, 447 Mich. 719):
State nuisance abatement law that permits
forfeiture of married couple's jointly owned car,
use and possession of which wife explicitly or
implicitly entrusted to husband, on basis of hus-
band's use of car for unlawful purpose without
wife's acquiescence or consent does not violate
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Questions presented: (1) Does Michigan nui-
sance abatement statute that permits forfeiture of
person's property if it is used in proscribed man-
ner by another person even if owner has no
knowledge of misuse of property violate Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause or Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause? (2) Does applica-
tion of that statute to deprive wife of her interest
in automobile that she jointly owned with her
husband violate Due Process Clause or Takings
Clause when forfeiture resulted from finding that
husband engaged in sex act with prostitute inside
automobile, and when record established that
wife had no knowledge that her husband would
use car in such manner?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/29/95, by Stefan
B. Herpel, of Ann Arbor, Mich.
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MICHIGAN ex rel. WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
John C. BENNIS and Tina B. Bennis, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97339.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
527 N.W.2d 483, 447 Mich. 719
Argued Oct. 5, 1994.
Decided Dec. 30, 1994.
RILEY, Justice.
In this case, we are required to construe
various aspects of the nuisance abatement statute.
Specifically, we must decide whether an act of
prostitution was consummated absent proof that
money was exchanged. Next, we must determine
whether the trial court erred in abating a vehicle used
to commit an act of prostitution in a neighborhood
with a reputation for illicit activity. Finally, we must
consider whether a co-owner's interest in a vehicle
may be abated where the co-owner allegedly had no
knowledge that the vehicle was used in proscription of
the statute.
We would hold that lewdness, incidental to
an act of prostitution, is activity squarely within the
purview of the nuisance abatement statute.
Alternatively, we conclude that proof of an exchange
of money is not necessary where, as here, it is clear
from the totality of circumstances that the sexual act
was in exchange for payment. Additionally, we would
uphold the abatement of this vehicle because the
defendant entered a neighborhood that is a known
place for prostitution and used his vehicle to engage in
illicit activity, thereby contributing to the existing
nuisance. Finally, pursuant to the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute, we would hold
that knowledge or consent is not required to abate the
interest of a co-owner.
I
John Bennis was arrested for gross indecency
on the evening of October 3, 1988. On that evening,
Detroit police officers Jacob Anthony and John Howe
set up surveillance after they witnessed a woman
"flagging" passing vehicles on the corner of Eight
Mile and Sheffield. The woman was later identified
as Kathy Polarchio. The officers next observed a
1977 Pontiac, driven by a man, later identified as John
Bennis, turn onto Sheffield and stop near Ms.
Polarchio, who approached and entered the passenger
side of the Pontiac. The officers followed the Bennis
vehicle, which proceeded a block, made a U-turn, and
stopped. Surveillance continued until the officers
noticed Ms. Polarchio's head disappear toward the
driver's side of the Pontiac. The officers immediately
approached the Bennis vehicle, shined a flashlight into
the front seat, and witnessed Ms. Polarchio
performing an act of fellatio on Mr. Bennis.
Mr. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency
in violation of M.C.L. §750.338b; M.S.A.
§28.570(2). The Wayne County prosecutor then filed
a complaint alleging that the Bennis vehicle was a
public nuisance subject to abatement pursuant to
M.C.L. §600.3801; M.S.A. §27A.3801. The vehicle
was co-owned by Mr. Bennis' wife, Tina Bennis, who
claimed that she had no knowledge that her husband
ever used their vehicle in violation of the statute. The
trial judge held that the vehicle was a nuisance and
abated the interest of defendant and his wife.
As noted above, M.C.L. §600.3801; M.S.A.
§27A.3801 provides for the abatement of a vehicle
used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or
prostitution. However, the statute does not define the
extent of activity required to constitute a nuisance.
Therefore, we must next determine whether an act of
prostitution committed in a neighborhood known for
illicit activity is within the purview of the statute.
A
Although the issue has not been resolved by
appellate decisions of this state, an attempt was made
to clarify the definition of nuisance in Motorama
Motel. .. .Motorama held that "[a] nuisance involves
the notion of repeated or continuing conduct and
should not be based upon proof of a single isolated
incident unless the facts surrounding that incident
permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited
conduct was habitual in nature." However, Motorama
's reliance on Bitonti is belied by the fact that only
four of the eight justices in Bitonti held that a single
act was sufficient to constitute an abatable nuisance.
As a result, existing Michigan precedent does
not specifically require more than a single incident of
conduct. However, cognizant of the activity that has
implicitly constituted a nuisance in previous actions,
we must determine whether the activity in this case
properly falls within the definition of nuisance as used
in M.C.L. §600.3801; M.S.A. §27A.3801.
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BBecause the public nuisance statute allows
the abatement of property used in a proscribed manner
without specifying the activity that will constitute a
nuisance, we are aided in the definition of a nuisance
by general public nuisance law. This Court has
defined a public nuisance as involving "not only a
defect, but threatening or impending danger to the
public. . . ." Similarly, this Court has declared a
public nuisance where an act "offends public
decency.
C
In construing the nuisance abatement statute,
"effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
sentence and section." Moreover, to discover the
legislative intent, "the entire act must be read, and the
interpretation to be given to a particular word in one
section arrived at after due consideration of every
other section so as to produce, if possible, a
harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.". . .
Several members of that neighborhood
testified about numerous incidents where they had
personally been accosted and solicited. The arresting
officer confirmed that many arrests for prostitution
were made in that neighborhood. Several neighbors
testified that they had been solicited on more than one
occasion. One witness testified that he had observed
acts of prostitution near the corner of Eight Mile and
Gardendale and that on one occasion he found his
young son staring at strange vehicles parked near that
corner in which men and women were apparently
committing acts of prostitution. These incidents
reflect concerns identical to those cited in Garfield and
Bloss.
Thus, the present case involves a condition
that, on the basis of the record below, is a public
nuisance in this neighborhood. It cannot be contested
that a significant threat to public peace and safety
exists in the Eight Mile and Sheffield neighborhood.
Vehicles that enter the neighborhood in order to solicit
acts of prostitution are being "used for" the
continuance of this nuisance. Therefore, we would
hold that the nuisance abatement statute allows the
abatement of a vehicle where the driver entered into
and thereby contributed to an existing condition that
is a public nuisance.
E
As previously stated, the nuisance abatement
statute has remained virtually unchanged since
Robinson, and our position therefore would apply a
priori to the present case. The one act of prostitution
in Robinson was considered with regard to the general
reputation of the entire building. Similarly, the one
act of nuisance by Mr. Bennis in his vehicle must be
viewed in light of the larger and continuing nuisance
occurring in the neighborhood. Where testimony
surrounding proof of an incident of prostitution
unequivocally establishes that the neighborhood has
a reputation for prostitution, the property contributing
to the continuance of the nuisance may be abated
pursuant to the statute. To hold otherwise would
allow the criminal actors to circumvent the statute
where a different vehicle was used in the commission
of each offense. The result would permit the
continuing blight of neighborhoods, contrary to the
clear intent of the statute. Accordingly, we would
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that the act of prostitution occurring in the Bennis
vehicle in a neighborhood known for prostitution was
not an abatable nuisance.
IV
Finally, we consider whether a co-owner's
interest in a vehicle may be abated where the co-owner
had no knowledge that the vehicle was used in a
manner proscribed by the nuisance abatement statute.
Despite the clear and unambiguous language of the
statute indicating that a property owner's knowledge
or consent is not required, decisions of this state have
nonetheless reached different conclusions with respect
to this issue. We would resolve the conflict and
would hold that knowledge is not required.
B
Finally, therefore, we consider the
constitutional significance of the abatement of Mrs.
Bennis' interest in the vehicle. We assume, arguendo,
that Mrs. Bennis did not have knowledge of or
consent to the misuse of the Bennis vehicle, of which
she was co-title owner. Historically, consideration
was not given to the innocence of an owner because
the property subject to forfeiture was the evil sought
to be remedied. As recently as the landmark forfeiture
case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, the
United States Supreme Court has reflected this view:
"the innocence of the owner of property subject to
forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a
defense."
Applying the principles of Van Oster and
Calero, it is evident that Mrs. Bennis' claim is without
constitutional consequence. Mrs. Bennis was a joint
owner who explicitly or implicitly entrusted Mr.
Bennis with the use and possession of their vehicle.
Van Oster, supra. It is clear from Calero that the
abatement of property stolen from the owner or taken
without the owner's knowledge would be prohibited.
However, on the basis of the facts before us, the
argument cannot be made that the vehicle was stolen
or initially driven without Mrs. Bennis' knowledge.
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* * *
Review of the controlling cases persuades us
that no constitutional violation results from the
abatement of Mrs. Bennis' interest in the vehicle. The
United States Supreme Court indisputably allows
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, unless
evidence was submitted that the property was stolen or
used without the consent of the owner. Van Oster;
Calero, supra. Other jurisdictions addressing the
issue have allowed the abatement of a co-owner's
interest on strikingly similar facts. The Michigan
nuisance abatement statute specifically obviates the
requirement of proof; and because the statute does not
violate the constitution, the Court of Appeals
incorrectly held that proof of knowledge of the
proscribed activity is required. Additionally, we do
not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in
fashioning an appropriate remedy, abating the entire
interest of the vehicle.
V
In summary, we would hold that an act of
lewdness as defined herein occurred and made the
vehicle abatable. Moreover, reviewing the entire
record, we find that an act of fellatio occurred so as to
create a clear inference that it was for monetary
compensation. Proof of an actual exchange of the
money is not required by the statute or decisions of
this Court. Thus, alternatively, we would hold that a
complete act of prostitution occurred in the Bennis
vehicle. Additionally, because the act occurred in a
neighborhood that was a place reputed for prostitution
and therefore a public nuisance, Mr. Bennis' vehicle
contributed to that continuing nuisance and may be
abated. Finally, we would hold that the clear and
unambiguous language of the Michigan nuisance
statute obviates the requirement of an owner's
knowledge of the proscribed activity and that the
statute unquestionably passes constitutional muster.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we would reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Chief Justice
(dissenting). [Omitted.]
LEVIN, Justice (dissenting). [Omitted.]
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PROPERTY SEIZURE UNDER FIRE, ALTHOUGH LAWS ARE SPREADING
Detroit Free Press
Wednesday June 7, 1995
David Zeman, Cecil Angel
Free Press Staff Writers
Your husband gets busted with a prostitute in the
family Buick. Boom, the car is grabbed by police.
Your hubby then gets his third drunken-driving
arrest in the family Mustang. Pow, your muscle car is
history as well.
You're devastated. After all, those cars cost
money.
But, in many cases, the government can seize and
sell your car at auction under laws either passed or
under consideration in Michigan and across the
country. Even if you own the vehicle with your
husband -- or wife. And even if you knew nothing of
your spouse's vices.
On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
review a Detroit case that will test a troubling aspect
of many forfeiture laws: whether the U.S. Constitution
permits the government to seize a person's property
even when that person was unaware the property was
being used illegally.
The court challenge comes as several Detroit area
communities have passed laws allowing the seizure of
cars used by repeat drunken drivers. A similar
measure sponsored by state Sen. Michael Bouchard,
R-Birmingham, has passed the state Senate and is
awaiting action in the House.
"Here's where you really can get the attention of
a stubborn mule by hitting him with a two-by-four,"
said Mayor Robert Bennett of Livonia, where a
drunken-driving forfeiture ordinance was passed
Monday. The Livonia law makes no distinction
between the drunken driver and the family member
who may co-own the car. As Bennett put it, "the wife
must stand in the shoes" of her inebriated husband.
Under any of these laws, people who lend their
cars to friends who drive drunk would lose their
vehicles only if they knew their friends were
intoxicated. Leasing companies also likely would be
exempt.
The Detroit case before the Supreme Court
addresses a different vice but similar issues. It stems
from the 1988 arrest of John Bennis under a state
nuisance law. In that case, police seized Bennis' car
after he was found having sex with a prostitute in it.
Tina Bennis, John's wife and co-owner of the car,
argued that the law was unconstitutional because it
didn't exempt owners who were unaware their
property was being used illegally.
Other Detroit area police have used the nuisance
law. In Pontiac on Saturday, police seized 18 vehicles
during a prostitution sting along Clark Street, a stretch
of road they contend is overrun by men soliciting sex.
The sting was strongly supported by Pontiac
Councilman Everett Seay, who said men are otherwise
able to pay fines and hide their arrests from family
members and friends. "I think they'll think twice,"
Seay said.
Critics, though, say these forfeiture laws raise
serious constitutional concerns. Chief among them:
That it is unconstitutional and fundamentally unfair to
take property from an innocent person without
compensation.
The Michigan nuisance law, enacted during
Prohibition, states that it's irrelevant whether the
person who owns the property knows that it was being
used for illegal activities such as gambling,
prostitution or the like. The law was more concerned
with ending the nuisance than with punishing the
individual. So if a building was used for gambling, or
if a car was used for bootlegging, the answer was to
get rid of the building or the car.
But the law is at odds with many modern-day
federal drug forfeiture laws, which exempt owners
who were unaware their property was being used for
illegal purposes.
Critics also say these laws punish people twice, in
violation of the constitutional ban on double jeopardy.
They argue that it is improper to first prosecute
someone for soliciting a prostitute or driving drunk
and further punish them by taking away their vehicle.
Critics add that the laws also may violate the
Constitution's Eighth Amendment ban on excessive
fines.
"The question becomes, what happens when we
seize a $30,000 Corvette?" said George Constance,
the city attorney for Warren, which recently passed a
drunken-driving forfeiture law over his objection.
But Bouchard said his measure addresses most of
these concerns. Under his bill, a judge would have
some discretion on whether to forfeit a vehicle once
the owner is convicted twice for drunken driving or a
third time for driving while impaired. But if a person
is convicted a third time for drunken driving or a
fourth time for being impaired, seizure is mandatory.
Bouchard said his measure is fair because the
forfeiture does not take place until after the person is
convicted. Moreover, a vehicle co-owner is entitled to
half the proceeds from the forfeiture if that person did
not know the offender was driving drunk.
"Complete due process is totally observed,"
Bouchard said.
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SUPREME COURT AGREES TO HEAR DISPUTE ON SEIZED AUTOMOBILE
Protection Against Property Forfeitures May Be Widened
The Washington Post
Copyright 1995
Tuesday, June 6, 1995
Joan Biskupic
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear the
case of a woman demanding restitution for her 1977
Pontiac, which was seized by Detroit police when they
caught her husband romancing a prostitute in the front
seat.
While the case offers the Supreme Court one of
its more salacious sets of facts, it may also lead to new
protection for potentially innocent owners who lose
their property through forfeiture. The court in recent
cases has limited the use of property forfeiture laws,
which are potent weapons and money-makers for
states and the federal government.
In the new case, Tina Bennis argues that her
constitutional right to due process was violated when
she lost her car because of the extracurricular
activities of her husband, John Bennis.
Tina Bennis testified that she provided most of
the money to buy the Pontiac, from baby-sitting and
odd jobs. She said that she knew nothing about her
husband soliciting prostitutes and that on the day he
was arrested, in October 1988, she thought he was
returning home straight from work.
But police were keeping tabs on Bennis after a
surveillance team saw him pick up a prostitute and
drive her to a dark residential street. When officers
who had tailed him shined a flashlight into the car,
they found the prostitute performing oral sex on
Bennis.
Bennis was convicted of gross indecency and the
Wayne~ C'nty cprsecutor se.ize A and A sl Pontiac
under a Michigan nuisance law that allows forfeiture
of vehicles used for lewdness or prostitution.
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
the forfeiture action, saying the 1925 anti-nuisance
law expressly states that an owner need not have
known or consented to illegal use of the property.
"Historically, consideration was not given to the
innocence of an owner because the property subject to
forfeiture was the evil sought to be remedied," the
Michigan high court said.
In Bennis's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, her
lawyer notes that justices have raised concerns in
recent forfeiture cases about the seizure of a truly
innocent owner's property.
"At some point, we may have to confront the
constitutional question whether forfeiture is permitted
when the owner has committed no wrong of any sort,
intentional or negligent," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
said in a 1993 case. "That for me would raise a
serious question."
Although the forfeiture provisions of federal law
usually exempt innocent owners, a ruling in the
Bennis case could set greater protections overall for
state and federal seizures.
The Bennises are still married. Tina Bennis's brief
coolly notes that although her husband jointly owned
the car, he has not joined her appeal to the Supreme
Court.
"She has a deep conviction that what the Wayne
County prosecutor did was wrong here and it was
important enough to her to override any other personal
considerations" in appealing the case, said her lawyer,
Stefan B. Herpel.
State prosecutors in Bennis v. Michigan argue
that "the offending property" can be seized regardless
of the innocence of an owner.
Separately yesterday, the court ruled 8 to I that
time spent in a halfway house cannot be counted
toward the defendant's overall prison sentence.
Ziya Koray, who had pleaded guilty in a federal
court in Baltimore to money laundering, was released
on bail to a halfway house while awaiting sentencing.
He was confined 24 hours a day for the three-month
interim.
The court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Willam
H. Rehnquist, said such restrictive bail is not "official
detention" under federal law and cannot be counted
toward Koray's prison sentence of 41 months. Justice
John Paul Stevens dissented in Reno v. Koray.
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94-6615 THOMPSON v. KEOHANE
Habeas corpus-State court findings-Determi-
nation of when suspect is in custody.
Ruling below (CA 9, 8/11/94, unpublished):
State court's determination that defendant was
not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is question of fact
entitled to presumption of correctness under 28
USC 2254(d) and may be disturbed on federal
habeas corpus only if it lacks fair support in
record or statutory exception to presumption of
correctness applies.
Question presented: What standard of review
should appellate court employ when there is con-
flicting caselaw on standard of review of when
suspect has been taken "into custody," triggering
requirement that Miranda warnings be
administered?
Petition for certiorari filed 10/3 1/94, by Carl





Charles E. Cole, Attorney General, State of Alaska, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 94-35052.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
34 F.3d 1073
Unpublished Disposition
Argued and Submitted Aug. 5, 1994.
Decided Aug. 11, 1994.
AFFIRMED.
MEMORANDUM
Carl Thompson appeals the district
court's denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Thompson alleges that
his incarceration violates the
Constitution because the state trial court
admitted statements that Thompson
argues were obtained in violation of his
Miranda rights and a confession that he
argues was involuntary. We affirm.
1.
We recently have held that a state
court's determination that a defendant
was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda is a question of fact entitled to
the presumption of correctness under 28
U.S.C. §2254(d). Thompson has not
shown, and it does not otherwise appear,
that any of the exceptions to the
presumption, apply in this case.
Accordingly, we may only disturb the
state court's factual determination if it
lacks even fair support in the record.
We have reviewed the entire
transcript of Thompson's interrogation.
Thompson voluntarily appeared at the
trooper headquarters. During the
interrogation, the troopers assured him
several times that he was free to
terminate the interview and leave.
Indeed, even after he confessed,
Thompson was permitted to leave when
the interview was complete. "Fair
support" exists for the state court's
determination that Thompson was not in
custody for Miranda purposes.
II.
We review de novo the question
whether, considering the totality of the
circumstances, Thompson's will was
overborne through psychological
pressure rendering his confession
involuntary. We have independently
evaluated the transcript of Thompson's
interrogation and conclude that, the




COURT TO HEAR ALASKA CASE ON SUSPECTS' RIGHTS
Anchorage Daily News
Tuesday, January 24, 1995
Laurie Asseo
The Associated Press
Washington - The Supreme Court on
Monday agreed to use an Alaska case to
clarify the standard that federal courts
must use in deciding whether police
violated criminal suspects' rights when
taking their statements.
The court agreed to hear arguments by
Carl Thompson, serving a life sentence for
a first-degree murder conviction in the
beating and stabbing death of his ex-wife.
Thompson contends police coaxed
him into confessing to the crime without
giving him the standard "Miranda"
warning of his right to remain silent and to
have an attorney.
On Sept 10, 1986, two moose hunters
found Dixie Gutman's body floating in a
pit 20 miles north of Fairbanks. She had
been severely beaten and stabbed 29
times.
Police asked Thompson to come to the
station for questioning. At first he denied
involvement in his ex-wife's killing, but he
eventually confessed, saying he killed her
because the two had been arguing and he
feared she was going to shoot him.
Police did not give Thompson the
Miranda warning, and he was allowed to
leave after the interview. But he was
arrested a few hours later, and eventually
was convicted of murder in state court.
Alaska state courts upheld his
conviction. In his appeal to federal court,
Thompson argued that his confession
should have been barred as trial evidence
because he was not given the Miranda
warning.
But a federal judge said Thompson
was not in police custody when he made
the statement and thus was not entitled to
the warning.
Police repeatedly told him he was not
under arrest and could leave at any time,
the judge said.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld that ruling.
In his high court appeal, Thompson is
asking the justices to decide whether
federal courts should conduct an
independent review of such questions
based on uniform federal standards.
State courts are not necessarily in a
better position to review whether someone
was in police custody at the time a
confession was made, he said.
Alaska prosecutors said such
questions should be considered issues of
fact to be decided by trial judges. They
added that evidence of Thompson's guilt
was overwhelming and that admission of
his confession would be considered
harmless.
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HOW MANY CRIMINALS HAS MIRANDA SET FREE?
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Wednesday, March 1, 1995
Paul G. Cassell
When the Senate Judiciary Committee holds
hearings next week on reforming the criminal justice
system, its main target should be the outdated and
harmful Miranda rules. As anyone who has ever
watched a cop show on TV knows, the Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona requires
police to warn suspects of their right to remain silent;
less well known is that Miranda also obligates police
to follow a series of procedural requirements for
obtaining admissible confessions. These rules have
hurt law enforcement's ability to prosecute dangerous
criminals.
The best information on Miranda's harms comes
from the before-and-after studies of confession rates in
the wake of the decision. A study in Pittsburgh
revealed that confession rates there fell from 48%
before the decision to 29% after. New York County
(Manhattan) District Attorney Frank Hogan reported
that confessions fell even more sharply, from 49%
before Miranda to 14%. Similar results were reported
in Philadelphia, Kansas City, Brooklyn, New Orleans,
and Chicago.
I have recently combined all of the available
before-and-after data in jurisdictions that complied
with Miranda's procedural requirements. In many of
these jurisdictions, police were advising suspects of
their rights even before Miranda. But after all the
Miranda procedural rules were imposed, confession
rates declined by 17 percentage points, from roughly
50% to 33%.
Confining the decline in confession rates in this
country is evidence from Britain. Until 1986, British
police told suspects they had the right to remain silent
but did not follow the other, particularly onerous,
features of the Miranda system, such as the right to
counsel during questioning and the requirement that a
suspect affirmatively agree to talk to police. Under
these rules, British police obtained confessions in
61% to 85% of cases. The same result is seen in
Canada, where the police obtain confessions about
70% of the time.
The British experience not only lets us assess
confession rates without the Miranda rules, but also
allows us to review what happens as a country moves
to a Miranda-style regime. In 1986, Britain adopted a
heavily regulated structure for police interrogations
that followed Miranda in many respects. Since then,
British confession rates have declined toward U.S.
levels. Studies suggest that British confession rates
have fallen to about 45%. In part because of these
falling confession rates, Parliament in November
changed the warning given to suspects and modified
other rules to encourage more confessions.
Of course, failing confession rates would be of
little concern if prosecutors could convict using other
available evidence. However, the literature suggests
that in the U.S. confessions or incriminating
statements are needed to obtain a conviction in about
24% of cases.
To my knowledge, no one has attempted to
quantify the number of criminal cases that are lost
each year because of Miranda. Yet it is possible
tentatively to calculate such a cost using the available
information. Multiplying the 17-percentage-point
reduction in the confession rate after Miranda by the
24% need for confessions suggests that 4.1% of all
criminal cases will be "lost" -- that is, cannot be
successfully prosecuted - because of the Miranda
requirements. (By way of comparison, the
exclusionary rule results in the loss of somewhere
between 0.6% and 2.4% of all cases.)
The costs in absolute numbers of lost cases are
staggering. Each year Miranda results in lost cases
against approximately 30,000 violent criminals and
90,000 property offenders for FBI-indexed crimes. In
addition, prosecutors lose cases against 62,000 drunk
drivers, 46,000 drug dealers and users, and several
hundred thousand lesser criminals. About the same
number of cases have to be plea-bargained on terms
more favorable to defendants because prosecutors are
in weaker bargaining positions without confessions.
These costs are entirely unnecessary. Miranda's
defenders have long argued that any change in the
decision's requirements would roll back the clock. But
time has passed Miranda's defenders by - they are
advocating a 1960s approach to preventing coerced
confessions when the 1990s offer superior solutions.
Congress should consider scrapping the Miranda
rules that depress the confession rate, particularly the
requirements that police obtain a suspect's affirmative
agreement to be questioned (a waiver of rights) and
that questioning stop immediately whenever a suspect
says the word "lawyer." Instead, police could be
required to videotape all custodial interrogations while
observing the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
coercion.
Videotaping would deter genuine police
misconduct more effectively than Miranda by creating
a clear record of police and suspect demeanor during
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questioning. To be sure, police can turn off video
cameras or deploy force off- camera. But if you were
facing a police officer with a rubber hose, would you
prefer a world in which he was required to mumble the
Miranda warnings and have you give some form of
waiver of rights (all proved by his later testimony)? Or
a world in which the interrogation is videotaped,
where your physical appearance and demeanor during
any "confession" are permanently recorded, with date
and time electronically stamped on the tape?
Videotaping is the clear winner.
While videotaping is at least as effective as
Miranda in preventing police misconduct, it has the
clear advantage of not inhibiting voluntary
confessions. In this country, the few jurisdictions that
have used videotaping have generally found no
noticeable effect on confession rates. Studies here and
in Britain have even suggested that police might
actually obtain more incriminating information when
interrogations are taped and available for later review.
Congress should allow police to question suspects
under such an alternative. In his Miranda opinion,
Chief Justice Earl Warren said, "our decision is no
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform." Since Miranda, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the Miranda rules
are not themselves constitutional rights, but are mere
"prophylactic safeguards" - presumably subject to
congressional modification for federal cases. Congress
should exercise its constitutional powers, as the final
arbiter of rules of evidence in federal court, to strike a
better balance between a suspect's right to be free
from coercion and society's right to have voluntary
confessions obtained and entered into evidence.
Miranda Warnings
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say may be used as evidence against
you.
You have the right to speak to an attorney before
being questioned and to have an attorney present
during questioning.
If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided for you.
Do you understand these rights?
Understanding these rights, do you wish to
answer my questions?
- Mr. Cassell is a professor at the University of
Utah College ofLaw.
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THE VIRTUES (AND LIMITS) OF SHARED VALUE
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MIRANDA'S CONCEPT OF CUSTODY
Adapted from 1993 University of Illinois Law Review 379 by Search and Seizure Law Report (Clark Boardman
Callaghan, 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014) Vol. 21, No. 3, March 1994
reproduced with permission of University of Illinois and Search and Seizure Law Report
University of Illinois Law Review Copyright (c) 1993 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois;
1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 379
Richard A. Williamson
INTRODUCTION
A familiar principle of the law of confessions
holds that once a person has been "taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way," the police may not interrogate that
person without complying with the procedural
safeguards mandated by Miranda v. Arizona.
Statements obtained during the period of custodial
interrogation without compliance with Miranda's
mandate may not be used, whether such statements are
exculpatory or inculpatory, or whether they constitute
"confessions" or merely "admissions" of part or all of
an offense.
In the years following Miranda, the Supreme
Court decided numerous cases that attempted to clarify
and refine the message of Miranda, including
decisions that informed the meaning of the terms
custody and interrogation. These concepts are central
to the Miranda decision. If a person is not in custody
when interrogated, the procedural safeguards of
Miranda do not apply. Likewise, a person in custody
but not interrogated receives no protection from the
Miranda decision. Only when the two concepts are
joined--when custodial interrogation occurs--is the
Miranda decision implicated.
Two Supreme Court decisions, California v.
Beheler and Berkemer v. McCarty, forged a link
between the Fourth Amendment's concept of arrest
and Miranda's concept of custody. In Beheler the
Supreme Court stated, that a suspect is not in custody
for Miranda purposes until "there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." Although that
statement arguably was dictum, one year later in
Berkemer the Court applied the Beheler standard to a
person detained in a routine traffic stop. The Court
held that the circumstances of a routine traffic stop are
analogous to a "Terry stop" and that the individual so
detained is not, without more, in custody for Miranda
purposes; therefore, he or she may be questioned
without first receiving the Miranda warnings.
Beheler and Berkemer specifically equated
Miranda's concept of custody with the Fourth
Amendment concept of arrest. Prior to Beheler and
Berkemer, the relationship between the concepts was
uncertain at best. Following Beheler and Berkemer,
a person under arrest or detained under circumstances
functionally equivalent to an arrest, is in custody for
Miranda purposes. Conversely, a person who has been
detained, who has suffered restrictions on freedom of
movement, and who clearly has been seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, is not in custody for Miranda
purposes unless formally arrested or subjected to
restraints functionally equivalent to an arrest.
The Fifth Amendment protection against
compelled self-incrimination, the constitutional
predicate for the Miranda decision, is not, as
Berkemer and Beheler implicitly recognize, the only
constitutional doctrine implicated when a suspect is
taken into custody and questioned. The government's
action in imposing custodial restraints also constitutes
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Unless the government supports the
seizure with information sufficient to constitute
"reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause,"
depending on the nature of the seizure, the Fourth
Amendment is violated and the seizure is unlawful.
Confessions obtained during the period of unlawful
detention may be inadmissible even though the
confession is otherwise voluntary and obtained in full
compliance with the Miranda decision.
The relationship between the concept of custody,
as that term is used in Miranda, and the concepts of
seizure, stop, and arrest, as those terms are defined for
Fourth Amendment purposes, is more complex,
however, than the above discussion reveals. During
approximately the same period during which the
Supreme Court promulgated and refined the Miranda
doctrine, it also validated under the Fourth
Amendment a police investigatory practice known as
"stop and frisk." Under the stop and frisk doctrine,
the police may undertake a temporary forcible
detention of a person and his or her possessions upon
"reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot
and may "frisk" the individual if they believe him or
her to be armed and dangerous. Although the objects
and limits of the investigatory techniques permissible
during the period of the temporary forcible detention
are not defined clearly, decisions interpreting the stop
and frisk doctrine, some of which occurred after the
Court decided Beheler and Berkemer, have held that
the police may pursue various methods of
investigation, including questioning the person
detained, for the purpose of either confirming or
dispelling the suspicion that prompted the detention.
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As Berkemer stated, none of the stop and frisk
decisions held that Miranda warnings must precede
investigative questioning during the period of the
temporary detention.
A person is seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when his or her freedom of
movement is restrained. This test apparently requires
examination of the circumstances surrounding a
police-citizen encounter to determine whether, under
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed he or she was not free to leave. Not every
police-citizen encounter, however, constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
If the person remains free to disregard the contact with
a police officer and walk away,, the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated, and the Constitution
requires no particularized and objective justification.
A forcible detention that exceeds what reasonably can
be characterized as a "temporary" detention--that is, a
detention that lasts longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the seizure or one in which
the investigative techniques employed are not the
"least intrusive" means reasonably available to verify
or dispel the officers' suspicions in a short period of
time--constitutes an arrest and must be supported by
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion, however, can
support a temporary detention; thus, the quantum and
quality of information required to support such a
detention is less than traditional probable cause. All
forcible detentions, however, are seizures within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The intersection and potential conflict between
the Miranda decision and the stop and frisk doctrine
are clear. A person is in custody for Miranda
purposes whenever that person has been deprived of
his or her freedom of movement in any "significant
way." A person is seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment whenever the government, by
means of physical force or show of authority, restrains
the person's freedom of movement. Prior to Beheler
and Berkemer, the nearly unanimous view of the lower
federal and state courts was that a person "under
arrest" was "in custody" for Miranda purposes; thus,
he or she could not be interrogated unless the
procedural safeguards of Miranda were met. However,
the pre-Beheler/Berkemer decisions understandably
made no attempt to utilize emerging Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to resolve the Miranda
custody question, apart from vague, conclusory
references to suspects "under arrest."
Precisely because the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that defines and differentiates the
concepts of stop and arrest is derived from values
seemingly unrelated to the values underlying the
Miranda decision, presumptive equation of the
concepts of "arrest" and "custody" is questionable. A
person who is "under arrest" for Fourth Amendment
purposes might not suffer the type of compelling
environment that serves as the essential predicate for
the Miranda rules. Likewise, some individuals subject
to investigative detentions who merely have been
stopped within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
may in fact need the protections provided by the
Miranda safeguards because of the compelling
circumstances of the detention. Following Beheler
and Berkemer, the Court decided several cases that
significantly expanded the nature and scope of
permissible activity during a Terry stop, thereby
indirectly affecting the protections afforded by the
Miranda decision to suspects temporarily detained.
Therefore, unless the Fourth Amendment values that
define the concept of arrest and distinguish it from the
lesser form of detention known as a stop remain
sufficiently sensitive to the factors that inform
Miranda's concept of custody, Beheler and Berkemer
significantly distort the Fifth Amendment values
advanced by the Miranda decision.
Arguably, an analysis of the Beheler and
Berkemer decisions that focuses solely on the Miranda
aspects of the cases is incomplete. The conclusion that
the two cases significantly and unjustifiably weaken
the analytical foundation of Miranda ignores the
consequences of the decisions on the investigatory
practice known as stop and frisk. One persuasive
justification for Beheler and Berkemer might be
simply that the objects of the stop and frisk doctrine
would be frustrated if the police were required to
administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning of
suspects temporarily detained for further investigation.
Moreover, full implementation of Miranda in
nonarrest detentions would be impracticable because
of the difficulty in quickly supplying counsel should
the suspect invoke his right to counsel. Thus, perhaps
the most compelling rationale for Beheler and
Berkemer is that Miranda's requirements must be
limited to cases involving a formal arrest or its
functional equivalent because to extend the concept of
custody to all detentions (i.e., seizures) for
questioning would be impracticable and would
significantly and unjustifiably undermine the purposes
of the stop and frish technique.
This article concludes that although the
relationship between the articulated values that inform
the distinction between the concepts of stop and arrest
and the articulated values that inform Miranda's
concept of custody are not perfect, substantial
fulfillment of the objectives of the Miranda decision
has been achieved and the function of the stop and
frisk doctrine has not been frustrated by the
presumptive equation of Miranda's concept of custody
with the Fourth Amendment concept of arrest. The
presumption that a person detained in a Terry stop is
not in custody is defensible, however, only if two
conditions are met.
First, courts must interpret and apply existing
precedent defining the term arrest in a manner that
gives full recognition to the Fourth Amendment values
that are implicated when a seizure occurs.
Specifically, courts must recognize that the Fourth
Amendment's command that seizures of people be
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reasonable cannot be implemented fully simply by use
of a clock and a yardstick. Moreover, although liberty
or freedom of movement is a valued right because a
right to go when and where we choose is essential to
a truly free society, liberty or freedom of movement is
a valued right also because it is one means by which
we can lawfully avoid the government's evidence
gathering techniques. Thus, in categorizing a seizure,
courts also must consider both the number and
intrusive character of the evidence gathering
techniques employed by the police during the
detention.
Second, courts must recognize and implement a
subtle, yet significant, distinction between Fourth and
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence grounded in the
values each constitutional provision advances.
Berkemer holds that the subject of an investigative
detention is in custody for Miranda purposes
whenever, during the period of the detention, a
reasonable person would have believed that he or she
was "under arrest," even though that fact was not
communicated to the suspect prior to questioning. By
contrast, under prevailing Fourth Amendment
standards, a suspect's belief or the belief of a
reasonable person in the suspect's position that he or
she was "under arrest" is not controlling. Instead, the
controlling issue is whether the circumstances of the
detention were within the permissible range of
activities authorized in a Terry stop. This subtle yet
significant difference in analysis provides the basis for
concluding, under appropriate circumstances, that a
suspect who has merely been "stopped" for Fourth
Amendment purposes nonetheless is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes.
CUSTODY - ESSENTIAL PREDICATE OF
MIRANDA DECISION
In Miranda, the Supreme Court sought to provide
some method to ensure that individuals subject to
police interrogation were accorded their Fifth
Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate
themselves. The Court specifically held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was available outside criminal
court proceedings and protected people "in all settings
in which their freedom of action [was] curtailed." The
element of compulsion, however, was the key to the
Miranda decision. The Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit the police or other institutions of government
from asking questions, nor does it prohibit a suspect
from volunteering an incriminating statement. What
the Fifth Amendment does prohibit is the use of any
practice or tactic that compels a person to incriminate
himself or herself. The prohibited element of
compulsion is present, according to the Miranda
decision, in all cases of "incustody" interrogation.
Having found compulsion inherent in the process
of in-custody interrogation, Miranda held that in order
to combat these pressures and to permit the full
opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the suspect "must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights" prior to
questioning. Moreover, the Miranda decision
mandated that a suspect's exercise of those rights be
honored fully.
Miranda therefore proceeds from the assumption
that a significant deprivation of freedom of
movement--the government's exercise of the right to
impose forcible restraints on an individual's freedom
of action, together with police- initiated
questioning--necessarily generates a form of
prohibited compulsion. Cases decided both before and
after Miranda have held that other prohibited forms of
compulsion, physical or psychological, may occur in
addition to those flowing from the fact of in-custody
questioning. The fact remains, however, that following
Miranda, a person in custody necessarily and always,
regardless of circumstances, is considered subject to
prohibited compulsion when interrogated, unless first
effectively warned of his or her constitutional rights.
Although one can argue that the logic of Miranda
does not require warnings for every suspect detained
(i.e., seized), the same argument can be made about
station house interrogation of suspects formally
arrested--not all suspects formally arrested and
subjected to interrogation necessarily subjectively
realize the type of compulsion identified by the
Miranda decision. The problem with Miranda, as with
any other decision designed to provide easily
administered guidelines, is one of line drawing: How
far beyond the situation of station house interrogation
of a suspect formally arrested can the factual predicate
of Miranda--the element of presumed coercion that
flows from a deprivation of freedom of movement--be
sustained?
THE CONCEPTS OF STOP AND ARREST
During the past decade, the Supreme Court
diligently attempted to clarify the Fourth Amendment
distinction between a nonarrest detention (a Terry
stop) and an arrest. Although implementation of the
guidelines remains difficult, the Court has provided at
least some fixed reference points. More importantly,
the Court has greatly expanded the circumstances
under which the stop and frisk doctrine can be
invoked, thereby necessarily increasing the likelihood
of Miranda issues arising during police interrogation
of suspects temporarily detained.
The doctrine also has undergone transformations
in other respects. Although the principal limitation on
a nonarrest detention remains temporal in nature the
Court has held that the "intrusiveness" of the
investigative means employed during the period of the
nonarrest detention is a factor that must be considered.
Florida v. Royer, decided one year before
Berkemer, remains one of the Supreme Court's most
significant rulings on the limits of nonarrest
detentions. In Royer, the Supreme Court held that the
"scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some
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extent with the particular facts and circumstances of
each case." The detention, however, "must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Additionally,
Royer held that "the investigative methods employed
should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in
a short period of time."
The Royer decision was important because the
Court recognized that various investigative
techniques-other than frisking or questioning the
suspect--could be employed during the period of a
Terry stop. Although questioning of the suspect
undoubtedly remains the primary investigative tool
that is permissible during a Terry stop, other practices
also are legitimate; for example, detention for the
purpose of bringing eyewitnesses or other detection
devices to the scene.
Most importantly, however, Royer implicitly
established that the Fourth Amendment values
implicated in nonarrest detentions include interests
beyond mere deprivation of the suspect's freedom of
movement. Even though a detention will become
indistinguishable from an arrest at some point due to
the mere passage of time, it also may become
indistinguishable from an arrest simply because of the
intrusive nature of the investigative means employed.
Royer's detention became indistinguishable from an
arrest, not because he was detained for an
unreasonable period, but because he was forcibly
moved to a private police interrogation room and
because the object of the detention--to confirm the
officers' suspicion that Royer was carrying drugs in
his luggage-was not pursued in the most "expeditious
way."
Royer was decided prior to Beheler and
Berkemer. After Beheler and Berkemer, three cases
followed in quick succession. In United States v.
Sharpe, the Court confirmed Royer's assertion that no
definitive time limit will be imposed on nonarrest
detentions; instead, a court must examine the reasons
why the officers detained the suspect and determine
whether the length of time the officers used to
"confirm or dispel" their suspicions was reasonable.
In Hayes v. Florida, the Court reaffirmed its
earlier holdings that the forcible movement of the
suspect to the station house for further investigation,
such as fingerprinting, exceeds the authority conferred
by Terry. The Court held that investigative practices
during the period of a Terry stop can "qualitatively
and quantitatively be so intrusive with respect to a
suspect's freedom of movement and privacy interests
as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments."
The most important post-Beheler/Berkemer case,
however, is United States v. Hensley. In Hensley, the
Court held that the permissible uses of a Terry stop
include nonarrest detentions for investigation of
completed crimes. More importantly, however,
Hensley held that for Fourth Amendment purposes, a
detention will be characterized according to the actual
circumstances of the detention and without regard to
the subjective intent of the police or, apparently, the
subjective or reasonable perceptions of the suspect.
"[W]hat matters," according to the Court, "is that the
stop and detention that occurred were in fact no more
intrusive than would have been permitted [in a Terry
stop]."
If a nonarrest detention can be transformed into a
de facto arrest simply because the investigative
techniques employed exceeded those reasonably
necessary given the circumstances that prompted the
detention or because the police exercised authority to
move the suspect, then the Fourth Amendment values
implicated by a seizure must include concern for
privacy interests. The character of a seizure, therefore,
is a factor not just of time and space but also the
ability of the government, given its ability to control
the suspect's movement, to subject the suspect to
intrusive evidence-gathering activities. Although the
Fourth Amendment may not directly limit the ability
of the government to investigate a suspect, it indirectly
affects the nature and scope of investigations by
limiting the government's ability to compel a person's
physical presence at any particular moment and at any
particular location. More importantly, the Fourth
Amendment also limits the ability of the government
to investigate a suspect on less than probable cause by
limiting the investigative techniques that can be
employed when a suspect has been detained on less
than probable cause.
The stop and frisk decisions also confirm that the
"intrusiveness" of the "means" by which a nonarrest
detention is effectuated requires consideration of
qualitative as well as quantitative factors surrounding
the seizure. Assessing the reasonableness of a seizure
requires balancing the extent of the intrusion against
the need for it, as well as considering the manner in
which it is conducted. Just as killing a fleeing felony
suspect under certain conditions may constitute an
unreasonable means of seizing a person. so too would
the use of excessive force or other debilitating
tactics--such as handcuffing--during the period of a
nonarrest detention. The Fourth Amendment values
inherent in the proscription against unreasonable
seizures include concern for personal safety and
human dignity. When the police possess probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime,
the use of reasonable force commensurate with the
objective of the seizure-indeterminate loss of
freedom-is authorized, and the individual's interest in
liberty or freedom of movement is subordinate and
will remain so for an indefinite period. But when the
police possess only reasonable suspicion that the
suspect has committed a crime, the objective of the
seizure- determinate loss of freedom--is limited.
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LIMITS OF SHARED VALUES
Although the values that inform the concepts of
custody and arrest are closely aligned, the analogy is
not perfect. Miranda's concept of custody is predicated
upon the belief that significant custodial restraints
produce, in the mind of the suspect, a form of
prohibited compulsion. The suspect's state of mind,
real or attributed, provides the factual predicate for the
assumption that compulsion exists when a suspect is
in custody. Miranda makes little sense if, in deciding
whether a suspect is in custody, no attempt is made to
view the situation as it might appear to a reasonable
person.
On the other hand, when the issue is whether a
suspect was subjected to a Terry-type nonarrest
detention or instead was arrested, the real or attributed
state of mind of the suspect is not important, given the
values that inform the distinction between the two
forms of seizure. When a seizure has occurred and the
issue is whether the seizure is a nonarrest detention or
a de facto arrest, the suspect's state of mind is
irrelevant to the advancement of legitimate Fourth
Amendment values. The Fourth Amendment, as a
check against unlawful arrests, guarantees freedom of
movement and the attendant privacy rights
accompanying the right to control locomotion until
such time as the government advances sufficient
justification--probable cause-for limiting those
freedoms. The Fourth Amendment's guarantee that we
will not be arrested in the absence of probable cause,
like its guarantee that our papers, houses, and effects
will not be searched or seized in the absence of
probable cause, operates as a check against
unreasonable actions by law enforcement officials; it
does not protect against psychic trauma associated
with the possibility-- unrealized--that our person,
papers, houses, and effects might be searched or
seized. A search of our papers, houses, and effects
occurs when, but only when, the police actually invade
our privacy; the Fourth Amendment is not violated
simply because we believe, perhaps reasonably so,
that our houses, papers, and effects are about to be
searched or seized, or both.
Similar reasoning applies to the law of arrests. A
lawful Terry stop is not rendered unreasonable simply
because the suspect believes he or she has been
arrested or is uncertain as to his or her fate during the
period of the temporary detention. Anxiety--a detained
suspect's fear of what might happen following a
lawful detention-simply is not a value recognized by
the Fourth Amendment. When a suspect has been
detained, the only issue is what actually happens to
the suspect--the nature and quality of his or her
detention. Objective factors therefore properly inform
the issue of whether an arrest has occurred.
Because the concepts of custody and arrest are not
aligned perfectly, one subtle yet potentially
outcome-determinative difference between the two
must be recognized and implemented. The
determination whether a detention, because of the
circumstances, crossed the threshold and became a de
facto arrest for Miranda, but not for Fourth
Amendment purposes, must be made with reference to
the likely perception of a reasonable person.
Berkemer's command that Miranda requires such an
inquiry must be given full force.
Two examples will demonstrate when the
divergence between Miranda's concept of custody and
the Fourth Amendment's concept of arrest could be
outcome determinative. In Case 1, upon reasonable
suspicion a suspect is detained for a brief period in a
manner that otherwise clearly would constitute a
nonarrest detention for Fourth Amendment purposes,
except that the detaining officer informs the suspect
that he is "under arrest." Assuming that Hensley's
post-hoc mode of analysis would not require a finding
of a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes
simply because the suspect was told he was "under
arrest," the suspect nonetheless must be deemed in
custody for Miranda purposes. The Miranda decision,
grounded as it is in the inherently compelling
environment of custodial questioning, virtually
compels a finding that the suspect, clearly seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes and informed that he is
"under arrest," should receive the Miranda warnings.
Although the mere fact that the suspect was told that
he was "under arrest" does not, in itself, implicate
Fourth Amendment values beyond those implicated by
the very fact of the lawful nonarrest detention, the
communication of the fact of arrest would have a
profound effect on a reasonable person's view of the
circumstances of custodial questioning that might
follow. To ignore the consequences of communication
of the fact of arrest in such a case would strike
adversely at the very predicate for the Miranda
decision.
In Case 2, a suspect is detained under
circumstances that, employing Hensley's post-hoc
mode of analysis, constitute a valid nonarrest
detention. The suspect's vehicle is stopped upon
reasonable suspicion that it contains contraband. The
stop is achieved when a uniformed officer (in a police
car with lights flashing) catches the suspect's speeding
vehicle. The officer approaches the vehicle with his
revolver drawn and orders the suspect out of the
vehicle. The officer further orders the suspect to
assume a "spread eagle" position. Following a Terry
frisk for weapons, the officer asks the suspect for his
driver's license and vehicle registration. The suspect
produces his own valid license and a bill of sale for
the vehicle in the name of another. In response to
questions concerning ownership of the vehicle, the
suspect states that it belongs to a friend. The officer
informs the suspect that he will be detained until the
arrival of a narcotics officer. At that point, the suspect
becomes nervous, indicates that he wants to leave, and
requests the return of his license. The officer tells the
suspect that he is not free to leave. Fifteen minutes
later, the narcotics officer arrives and informs the
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suspect that he believes the vehicle contains
contraband. The narcotics officer twice asks the
suspect for permission to search the vehicle. Both
times, the suspect declines. The narcotics officer then
steps on the rear of the vehicle and, when it does not
move, concludes that it is overloaded. The officer puts
his nose against the trunk and states that he smells
marijuana. When the suspect is asked directly whether
the vehicle contains marijuana, he responds, "It's not
mine. I was just carrying it for a friend." The narcotics
officer opens the trunk and finds a large quantity of
marijuana.
The facts of Case 2 are, in essence, the facts of
United States v. Sharpe, except that in Sharpe no
questioning of the suspect occurred before the
marijuana was discovered. In Sharpe, the only issue
presented was the legality of the detention prior to the
discovery of the drugs. The Supreme Court concluded
that the suspect was validly detained upon reasonable
suspicion until such point as the narcotics officer
detected the odor of marijuana and that the search of
the vehicle was, therefore, not a "fruit" of a prior
illegal detention.
Assuming arguendo that the Fourth Amendment
issue presented is properly resolved in the
government's favor employing the post-hoc mode of
analysis, the issue remains whether the questioning of
the suspect is permissible in the absence of Miranda
warnings. If the issue of custody is determined as
Beheler commands with reference to the likely state of
mind of the suspect, this suspect surely would have
felt the type of compelling environment described in
Miranda. This suspect was forcibly detained by two
officers. Firearms were displayed, and the suspect was
frisked. He was informed that a narcotics officer had
been called to the scene and that he was not free to
leave. He was detained under these circumstances for
fifteen minutes and, upon the arrival of a narcotics
officer, was asked to consent to a search of the
vehicle. Finally, he was specifically accused of driving
a vehicle that the police suspected-- confirmed by the
odor--contained marijuana and asked directly whether
the vehicle contained marijuana. A more compelling
environment outside Miranda's paradigm station
house interrogation is difficult to envision.
The use of a test for custody that focuses on the
perception of a reasonable suspect under the
circumstances is more than a semantic exercise. It is
true, of course, that the reasonable perception
approach requires a court to place itself in the position
of the suspect and attempt to discern how a typical
person would view his or her condition. The reality, of
course, is that suspects would react differently and that
no single state of mind can be attributed to all
suspects confronted with similar circumstances. The
reasonable person approach, however, is desirable and
defensible not because of its factual accuracy but
because it is the approach that most closely
approximates the factual and legal predicates for the
Miranda decision. We evaluate Fourth Amendment
stop/arrest issues utilizing a post-hoc mode of analysis
because the detained suspect's perception of his status
is irrelevant to the full implementation of the Fourth
Amendment values implicated by his detention. The
characterization of a detention is determined by what
happens to the suspect, not what he or she believes
might happen. What is important for Fourth
Amendment purposes is what actually transpires
during the period of the nonarrest detention. Is he or
she forcibly subdued and restrained? Is he or she
detained for a substantial period of time? Is he or she
subjected to extensive and intrusive evidence
gathering techniques?
When the issue is, however, whether the detained
suspect needs the prophylactic safeguards mandated
by Miranda, the suspect's actual or presumed state of
mind is of critical importance. In fact, Miranda makes
little sense unless the focus is on the suspect's actual
or presumed state of mind. Thus, use of the reasonable
perception standard for purposes of determining
Miranda's concept of custody is defensible even
though the use of that standard may produce cases
where the police will be required to administer
warnings to a suspect merely detained in a nonarrest
situation upon reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the Fourth Amendment
values that inform the distinction between stops and
arrests and the Fifth Amendment values that inform
Miranda's concept of custody, although not symbiotic,
is such that it is both intellectually defensible and
logical to presume that a suspect detained in a routine
nonarrest detention--a Terry stop--may be questioned
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Both
constitutional concepts, to a greater or lesser extent,
focus on the means used by the police to achieve their
objectives, both limit the scope of the government's
permissible evidence gathering techniques, and both
require characterization of a forcible detention.
Moreover, the wholesale injection of Miranda based
logic into the investigative practice known as stop and
frisk significantly would undermine the function of
such detentions and well might place demands on the
criminal justice system--the need for counsel--that
would be impossible to fulfill.
Reconciliation of Miranda with the circumstances
attendant to stop and frisk activity is difficult because
the constitutional validation of the investigative
technique known as stop and frisk occurred after
Miranda was decided. The Miranda decision,
therefore, understandably did not address the need for
warnings in the context of a nonarrest detention.
Accommodation of Miranda with the stop and frisk
doctrine therefore was a necessary step, and Berkemer
provided a workable framework for the resolution of
the issue. Although Berkemer tempts courts to
conclude that Miranda warnings never are required
during the period of a Terry-type nonarrest detention,
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such a categorical reading of Berkemer is erroneous
and would produce a restrictive and indefensible
limitation on Miranda that would undermine
significantly both the legal and factual predicates for
the Miranda decision. Berkemer's equation of the
concepts of custody and arrest is presumptive only.
Moreover, in defining the concept of arrest, whether
for Fourth Amendment purposes or for purposes of
determining Miranda's concept of custody, courts must
be sensitive to the full range of Fourth Amendment
values implicated when a person is seized and must
not simply look to the spatial and temporal aspects of
the detention. Finally, courts must recognize that the
standard employed for the resolution of Miranda's
custody issue in nonarrest detention cases must be
made from the perspective of how a reasonable person
under the circumstances would have viewed his or her
position at the time of questioning.
Professor Williamson teaches law at the College of
William and Mary.
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94-7448 BAILEY v. U.S.
Sentencing-Mandatory sentence for using or
carrying firearm during drug trafficking offense.
Ruling below (CA DC (en banc), 36 F.3d 106,
56 CrL 1060):
Test for determining whether accused "uses or
carries" firearm "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" with-
in meaning of 18 USC 924(c)(1), which imposes
additional, mandatory five-year sentence on any-
one using or carrying firearm during drug of-
fense, consists of two elements: gun's proximity to
drugs involved in underlying offense, and gun's
accessibility to defendant from place where
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds are
located; applying this test, conviction of defend-
ant that was based on police discovery of loaded
pistol and $3,216 in cash in trunk of car that
defendant was driving when he was arrested on
drug charge, as well as discovery of 30 grams of
cocaine in passenger compartment, is affirmed.
Question presented: Did 5-4 decision of court
below misinterpret 18 USC 924(c)(1) by adopt-
ing standard that looks solely to "proximity and
accessibility" of firearm to drugs or drug pro-
ceeds rather than to active employment of
firearm?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/28/94, by
James G. Duncan, Roy T. Englert Jr., and
Mayer, Brown & Platt, all of Washington, D.C.
94-7492 ROBINSON v. U.S.
Sentencing-Mandatory sentence for using or
carrying firearm during drug trafficking offense.
Ruling below (U.S. v. Bailey, CA DC (en
banc), 36 F.3d 106, 56 CrL 1060):
Test for determining whether accused "uses or
carries" firearm "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" with-
in meaning of 18 USC 924(c)(1), which imposes
additional, mandatory five-year sentence on any-
one using or carrying firearm during drug of-
fense, consists of two elements: gun's proximity to
drugs involved in underlying offense, and gun's
accessibility to defendant from place where
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds are
located; applying this test, conviction of defend-
ant that was based on police discovery of pistol
inside locked trunk in bedroom closet of apart-
ment that was searched after police made several
controlled drug buys there from defendant is
affirmed.
Question presented: Did 5-4 decision of court
below misinterpret 18 USC 924(c)(1) by adopt-
ing standard that looks solely to "proximity and
accessibility" of firearm to drugs or drug pro-
ceeds rather than to active employment of fire-
arm or to other relevant factors such as type of
weapon involved, whether it was loaded, and
presence of expert testimony to support govern-
ment's theory of "use"?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/29/94, by David
B. Smith, and English & Smith, both of Alexan-
dria, Va.
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GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
This consolidated case involves two separate
challenges, one by appellant Roland Bailey and one
by appellant Candisha Robinson, to their convictions
under 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1). In relevant part, that
section imposes a five-year term of imprisonment
upon anyone who "during and in relation to any crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or
carries a firearm." We have long required that in
order to support a conviction under §924(c)(1), the
government must demonstrate both a "nexus . . .
between a particular drug offender and the firearm,"
and that "the gun facilitateld] the predicate offense in
some way." In order to assess whether the
government has made the required showing, we have
developed an open-ended test that takes account of
numerous factors arguably relevant to whether a gun
was used in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Applying this test, divided panels of the court affirmed
Bailey's conviction, and reversed Robinson's
conviction.
Because this complex, open-ended test has
produced widely divergent results and because we
believe that it intrudes the court into the province of
the jury, we now replace it with a test that looks to
two factors only: the proximity of the gun to the drugs
involved in the underlying offense, and the
accessibility of the gun to the defendant from the place
where the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds
are located. Applying that test, we affirm both
convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
Each defendant appealed his or her §924(c)(1)
conviction on the ground that the Government had
failed to adduce sufficient evidence at trial that he or
she had "used" or "carried" a firearm in relation to a
drug offense. Different panels affirmed Bailey's
conviction and reversed Robinson's, in each case over
a dissent. Bailey and the government respectively
suggested rehearing in banc. In order to resolve the
apparent inconsistencies in our various decisions
applying §924(c), we consolidated the two cases and
reheard them in banc.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 924(c)(1) states that:
Whoever, during and in relation to any. . . drug
trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment for such ...
drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to
imprisonment for five years.
By requiring that the use of the firearm be "in relation
to" a drug trafficking offense, the Congress made it
clear that it did not intend to criminalize the mere
possession of a firearm by someone who commits a
drug offense. "[Tihe firearm must have some purpose
or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crune; its
presence or involvement cannot be the result of
accident or coincidence." At the same time, it is clear
that a firearm need not actually be brandished in order
to be used or carried in connection with a drug
trafficking offense....
A. Section 924(c)(1) to Date
In an effort to distinguish between mere
possession of and the use or carrying of a gun in
connection with a drug trafficking crime, we held early
on that more than just evidence of proximity was
required to establish "that the gun supported the
possession crime." By the next year, we were able to
state that "a number of factors" may be relevant in any
particular case: "courts have identified and will
[continue to] identify" such factors. Just two years
later Judge Wald summarized the development of our
case law this way:
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[W]e have enumerated a nonexclusive set of
factors to weigh in making that [distinction].
Among other things, we look to whether a gun is
accessible to the defendant, whether it is located
in proximity to the drugs (which may cut either
way depending on the facts of a particular case),
whether it is loaded, what type of weapon it is,
and, finally, whether there is expert testimony to
bolster the government's particular theory of
"use." . . .
Defendants Bailey and Robinson do not attack
this open-ended (for convenience Bruce-Morris-Derr)
approach in determining whether a gun was used
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Preliminarily, therefore, we survey the problems
inherent in the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach: intrusion
into the province of the factfinder, seemingly
inconsistent results, and a continuing conflict with the
interpretation of §924(c)(1) adopted by virtually every
other circuit.
1. The Province of the Jury
Whether a gun was used during and in relation to
a drug trafficking offense is, at its core, a question of
fact. In a case where the gun was not actually fired or
brandished during the commission of the crime, it may
well be an ultimate rather than a basic fact, but it is
still a question of fact and not of law. Of course, an
appellate court may properly determine, as a matter of
law, the baseline or minimum conduct that can
constitute a "use," and it must determine in each case,
with appropriate deference to the jury, whether the
record contains sufficient evidence of such conduct.
The reviewing court does not sit, however, to make its
own finding with respect to an ultimate fact.
Weighing the evidence is a function assigned to the
jury: "We are not a second jury weighing the evidence
anew and deciding whether or not we would vote to
convict the defendant." Yet the use of an approach
that requires the court to weigh numerous factors and
to determine the specific relevance of individual facts
in order to assess the sufficiency of the evidence
invites the court to do just that.
The Bruce-Morris-Derr approach strips from the
jury its "responsibility [as] the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts." For example, in United
States v. Bruce, we were at considerable pains to
determine whether a small gun found in the pocket of
a coat along with a stash of drugs "was intended for
use only at the time of distribution" or was rather "the
sort of weapon a drug dealer would employ for
protection against an effort to penetrate a crack
house." Determining that the former was more likely
true, we reversed the conviction. Similarly, in Derr
and Robinson, the panel struggled to determine for
itself the significance of the fact that the defendant's
gun was locked respectively in a closet or trunk with
a stash of drugs at the time of the defendant's arrest.
Determining the weight to be given a single piece of
evidence is not ordinarily an appropriate function for
an appellate court.
A due regard for the limits that the jury system
necessarily places upon the scope of our review would
not lead us to abdicate all our responsibility as an
appellate court-for example by affirming any
conviction in which a gun is found and there is some
connection, no matter how speculative or remote,
between the gun and the predicate drug offense. A
jury may convict a defendant for any of a number of
impermissible reasons, and therefore, if the defendant
claims that the evidence against him is insufficient to
sustain his conviction, we must as an appellate court
review the record conscientiously. Nor does our
recognition that the approach heretofore used in this
circut impinges upon the province of the jury by itself
predetermine precisely how we ought to review a
§924(c)(1) case. It does, however, strongly suggest
that we must replace the open-ended
Bruce-Morris-Derr approach with a manageable
standard, we must, that is, state clearly the minimum
showing that the government must make in order to
put to the jury the question whether a defendant has
violated §924(c)(1).
2. Inconsistent Results
The open-ended approach described in Derr has
produced widely divergent and seemingly
contradictory results. . . . Although each of these
cases can be distinguished on the basis of one or
another fact--for example, by looking to the type of
gun involved or to how easily the defendant could
have grabbed the gun at the time that he was
arrested-such distinctions seem counter-intuitive if
not arbitrary. Having reflected upon our experience,
we think it apparent that the court has failed to take a
consistent approach because it has not laid down a
standard that yields determinate results in any but the
easiest of cases.
3. Conflict with Other Circuits
No other circuit has found our open-ended
approach persuasive. Our sister circuits have each
adopted a definition of "use" that is considerably
broader than firing, displaying, or otherwise
brandishing the firearm. They focus upon whether the
evidence concerning the location of the gun is
sufficient to permit the july to conclude that the gun in
some way facilitated the predicate drug trafficking
offense. From a functional perspective, the standards
they have developed for assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence are much more similar to the "proximity
and accessibility" standard we adopt today than to the
open-ended approach that we have used in the past.
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Every other circuit similarly focuses, in essence,
upon whether the firearm was accessible and
proximate to the defendant during the commission of
the drug offense....
B. Section 924(c) Henceforth
As the Supreme Court has made clear, the
government must make two distinct showings in order
to obtain a conviction under §924(c)(1): "that the
defendant 'use[d] or carrie[d] firearm' " and "that the
use or carrying was 'during and in relation to' " a
predicate offense. Therefore, in determining what the
proper standard should be, we must determine both
what constitutes the use or carrying of a gun and in
what circumstances such a use or carrying is in
relation to a drug trafficking offense.
1. "Use" of a Firearm
In the context of §924(c)(1), "use" could be
defined either narrowly, so as to encompass only the
paradigmatic uses of a gun, i.e., firing, brandishing, or
displaying the gun during the commission of the
predicate offense, or more broadly, so as to include the
other ways in which a gun can be used to facilitate
drug trafficking. The narrow definition has the virtue
of simplicity; it is, after all, relatively easy to
determine whether the defendant's firing, brandishing,
or displaying a gun was related to the defendant's
contemporaneous (recall the "during" requirement of
§924(c)(1)) drug trafficking offense. The narrow
definition also has the vice of simplicity, however; it
is too narrow to capture all of the various uses of a
firearm that the Congress apparently intended to reach
via §924(c)(1).
Like firing, brandishing, or displaying a gun,
barter involves handling the gun. A gun can surely be
used even when it is not being handled, however. For
example, a gun placed in a drawer beside one's bed for
fear of an intruder would, in common parlance, be a
gun "used" for domestic protection.
This more inclusive understanding of "use" has
long been recognized in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. In Astor v. Merritt, the Court was
required to interpret a customs statute that exempted
from duty "[w]earing apparel in actual use ... of
persons arriving in the United States." The petitioner
sought an exemption for clothing that he and his
family had purchased abroad, but not yet worn. The
Court accepted his argument: If a person residing in
the United States should purchase wearing apparel
here, in a condition ready for immediate wear without
further manufacture, intended for his own use or wear,
suitable for the immediately approaching season of the
year, and not exceeding in quantity, quality or value
the limit above mentioned, no one would hesitate to
say that such wearing apparel was 'in actual use' by
such person, even though some of it might not have
been actually put on or applied to its proper personal
use.... An article of wearing apparel, bought for use,
and appropriated and set apart to be used, by being
placed in with, and as a part of, what is called a
person's wardrobe, is, in common parlance, in use, in
actual use, in present use, in real use, as well before it
is worn as while it is being worn or afterwards.
Likewise, in Smith, the Court noted with approval the
following definition of the verb "to use": " 't]o make
use of, to convert to one's service; to avail oneself of;
to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means
of' "
In the context of §924(c)(1), therefore, we hold
that one uses a gun, i.e., avails oneself of a gun, and
therefore violates the statute, whenever one puts or
keeps the gun in a particular place from which one (or
one's agent) can gain access to it if and when needed
to facilitate a drug crime. In a case where the
predicate offense involves the distribution of drugs,
the government must show that the defendant had the
gun in such a place at the time that the drugs were
being distributed. In a case when the predicate
offense is possession with the intent to distribute
drugs, however, the government need not prove that
the gun was in that place during the entire period that
the defendant illegally possessed the drugs or that it
was in that place at the time that the defendant was
arrested. Because possession with the intent to
distribute is a continuing offense--that is, an offense
that extends through time--the government need only
prove that the defendant put or kept the gun in that
place at some point while the defendant illegally
possessed the drugs.
2. "During" and "In Relation To"
Once it is determined that the defendant has used
or carried a gun, the more difficult question is whether
he has done so "in relation to a drug trafficking
offense." As the Court noted in Smith, this
requirement "at a minimum, means that the firearm
must have some purpose or effect with respect to the
drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement
cannot be the result of accident or coincidence." For
the statute to be violated, therefore, the gun "must
Tacilitat[e] or ha [ve] the potential of facilitating' the
drug trafficking offense." Using a gun to protect one's
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or the proceeds of one's
drug sales is therefore clearly a prohibited use of the
gun. Our prior decisions under §924(c)(1) recognize
as much.
In sum, it is apparent that positioning a firearm in
such a way that it protects or is otherwise integrated
into one's drug trafficking is not just a use of that gun,
but is a use of that gun in relation to a drug trafficking
offense and is therefore covered by the statute. What,
then, is sufficient evidence that a gun found at the
scene of a drug crime is being used in this way?
Whenever there is sufficient evidence for a jury to
find that the defendant at some time during the
commission of the predicate drug offense put or kept
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a firearm in a place where it would be proximate to
and accessible from a place that is clearly connected to
his drug trafficking (e.g., a place used to store,
manufacture, or distribute drugs, or to keep the
proceeds of drug transactions), the jury may also infer
that the gun was being used to protect the drug
trafficking operation, and was therefore being used in
violation of §924(c)(1). We emphasize that the jury
may draw this inference regardless whether the
predicate offense is one of drug distribution or of
possession with intent to distribute drugs; we reject
any suggestions to the contrary in our prior opinions.
As the Eighth Circuit has stated: It has become
common knowledge that drug traffickers typically
keep firearms available to protect themselves and their
drugs and drug money. The presence and the
availability of the firearms are often crucial to the
"success" of the drug enterprise. It is therefore
permissible for juries to infer that firearms found
among a drug trafficker's paraphernalia are used to
further the drug venture and are thus used during and
in relation to drug trafficking within the meaning of
section 924(c)(1).
This test for use is not only an accurate means of
ensuring that the scope of §924(c)(1) is as broad as
the Congress intended it to be; it will also avoid the
problems with the Bruce-Morris-Derr approach that
we outlined above. First, as we have already noted,
placing or keeping a gun in such a way that it protects
a drug trafficking operation is clearly a "use" of a gun
"in relation to a drug trafficking offense." In most
cases, the gun's proximity to and accessibility from the
actual site of the defendant's drug trafficking will be
the most probative evidence that the defendant was
using the firearm to protect his drug trafficking.
Similarly, whether the defendant carried the gun with,
or to or from the location of, the drugs will be the
most probative evidence that he carried it during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Second, this
test can be readily administered both by the district
court, which must determine whether the
Government's case may go to the jury, and by the
appellate panel that must detennine whether the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under
§924(c)(1). As such, it will assure greater uniformity
across cases while penalizing more precisely the
conduct that the Congress intended to reach.
C. Application of the Standard
Applying the standard for "use" to the present
cases, we hold that the Government presented
sufficient evidence to convict both Bailey and
Robinson. When Bailey was arrested, there were 30
grams of cocaine, more than $3,200 in cash, and a
loaded 9-mm. pistol in his car. He was properly
convicted of possession with the intent to distribute
the cocaine. Because the gun was found in the same
place as the cash (namely, the trunk) and in the same
car as the drugs that formed the basis of his drug
trafficking conviction, the jury was entitled to infer
that the money was the proceeds of an ongoing drug
operation. The requirements of proximity and
accessibility were both satisfied. The gun was
proximate to the drugs and was easily accessible to
Bailey at any time that he was handling either the
drugs or the proceeds of their sale. The jury could
reasonably infer that Bailey had intentionally
incorporated the gun into his drug operation, was
using it as part of that operation, and was therefore
using it in relation to his possession with intent to
distribute the drugs. Although the record does not
demonstrate that Bailey had made a specific drug sale
(the amount of money he had notwithstanding), there
is little reason to doubt that he was using the gun in
relation to the possessory offense regardless whether
the gun actually furthered the possessory offense or
emboldened him to commit that offense. It is enough
that the jury was entitled to conclude that Bailey had
put the gun into the car not for some unrelated
purpose but because he was keeping drugs there; that
alone establishes that the gun was used in relation to
Bailey's drug trafficking offense. We therefore affirm
his conviction.
The same analysis requires that we affirm
Robinson's conviction. In her case, the firearm was
found in the same locked trunk as were the drugs that
formed the basis of her conviction for possession with
intent to distribute. Again, the requirements of
proximity and accessibility are obviously satisfied:
The gun was proximate to the drugs, and it was
accessible to anyone, such as Robinson, who had
access to the drugs. Because the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the drugs were Robinson's--a
finding not at issue here-it could also infer from these
facts that Robinson placed or kept the gun in the same
location as the drugs in order to protect her possession
of the drugs. Hence, the jury was entitled to conclude
that Robinson used the gun in relation to the drug
trafficking offense.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we reject the open-ended
Bruce-Morris-Derr approach and conclude instead that
in order to survive a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence for a conviction under §924(c)(1), the
Government need only point to evidence that the
firearm in question was in proximity to the drugs,drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds and was
accessible to the defendant from the site of the drugs,
drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds involved in his
or her predicate drug trafficking offense. When there
is evidence of proximity and accessibility, we will
affirm a conviction under §924(c)(1). Because the
government presented such evidence at the trials of
both Bailey and Robinson, the judgments of
conviction in each case are
Affirmed.
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WALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
There are four reasons why I believe the
majority's bright line test for determining whether a
gun has been "used" to commit a drug offense is
wrong. First: Although I agree that "use" under 18
U.S.C. §924(c)(1) requires the government to show
that the gun in some way "facilitated" the defendant's
commission of the underlying drug offense, the
sticking point is what kind of evidence it takes to
make that showing. The Bruce-Morris-Derr line of
cases did not in that sense set forth any test or formula
for making such a determination; rather, it provided
only a list of potentially relevant factors, i.e., the type
of weapon involved, whether it was loaded, the
presence of expert testimony to support the
government's theory of "use," the proximity of the gun
to the drugs, and the accessibility of the gun to the
defendant. By focusing on only two of the
factors--(1) proximity of guns to drugs, drug
paraphernalia, or drug proceeds and (2) accessibility
of the guns to the defendant from a place used to store
drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds--to the
exclusion of any other relevant factors, the majority in
my view diminishes rather than enhances the prospect
of accurate assessment on a case-by-case basis as to
whether the gun was used to facilitate the drug
offense. Congress, it should be noted, created no
statutory presumption that "use" automatically would
follow from the presence of any particular factors, and
I can find no authority for courts to do so.
Third: The new test is not only unduly rigid, it is
not even clear. I cannot fathom how the accessibility
prong, as defined by the majority, will work, or what
indeed it adds to the minimal proximity test. It seems
that whenever the guns are located proximately to the
drugs, they must also be potentially accessible to the
defendant from the place the drugs are being stored.
Thus if the guns and drugs are found together in a
locked strongbox and the defendant is miles away,
under the majority's test, the guns are arguably
accessible to the deedA from the+ place whreth
drugs are stored and are being "used" to facilitate the
possession of the drugs. To state the proposition is to
reveal its illogic. Under the statute it is the defendant
who must use the gun, so it is the accessibility of the
gun to him at the time of the drug offense charged that
is relevant, not the accessibility of the gun to a
phantom defendant who is positioned where the drugs
are. This latter definition of accessibility makes no
sense whatsoever. Indeed, the majority's peculiar
definition of accessibility renders their "use" test much
looser than that endorsed by several other circuits,
which at least focus on whether the guns were
proximate to the defendant as opposed to merely
accessible from the place where the drugs, drug
paraphernalia, or drug proceeds are stored.
* *
Finally, while I find Judge Williams' narrower
interpretation of "use" quite persuasive, I cannot go so
far as to agree that an actor who has intentionally
placed a gun within easy access of his person in order
to guard or to distribute drugs is not using the gun to
facilitate the drug offense unless he openly brandishes,
displays, or makes verbal threats about the gun.
Where evidence of ready access to a gun by the
defendant guarding or distributing the drugs exists, I
think the jury can fairly draw the inference that such
access is an intrinsic part of the criminal drug
trafficking act. But conversely, I do not, like the
majority, think it a fair inference that where the
defendant has no such ready access to the gun, but
instead is shown merely to be in constructive
possession of the drugs which are located near the gun
but away from the defendant, he is nonetheless using
the gun to facilitate his possession or distribution.
That I believe to be the principal difference between
the other dissenters and myself, since I agree with
them that "use" involves activity of some sort by a
defendant who is in the immediate vicinity of the
weapon, and not mere placement of the weapon near
the drugs. That difference, however, is of sufficient
import so as not to allow me to subscribe to Judge
Williams' bright line rule any more than the
majority's. Bright lines have a place in our
jurisprudence but primarily with respect to what third
parties like policemen or citizens can do without
running afoul of the law. They are distinctly less
useful in telling juries or judges what kind of evidence
will suffice to show that a defendant is guilty of a
generic crime that can be committed against a
thousand different factual backdrops.
Because I believe that there was sufficient
evidence to support Bailey's conviction for use in
relation to actual possession of drugs with intent to
distribute, i.e., the gun in the trunk of the car was
readily accessible to protect the drugs in the passenger
compartment, but not Robinson's, i.e., there was proof
only of drugs and an unloaded gun in a locked trunk in
a bedroom closet, I would affirm the first conviction
and reverse the second. I would not adopt the
majority's proximity and accessibility test but would
instead continue to allow juries and judges to rely on
all relevant factors to decide each case.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, with whom
SILBERMAN and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:
Nearly all of our sister circuits say that mere
possession of a firearm does not constitute "use" under
18 U.S.C. §924(c). In the same breath, however,
all--joined today by this court-allow conviction
without evidence of the defendant's firing,
brandishing, displaying or actively using the firearm
in any way. In joining the other circuits, the court
undoubtedly simplifies our previous vague
multifactored balancing test for review of §924(c)
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cases for sufficiency of the evidence. And the majority
is surely right that it is perfectly appropriate to
overturn statutory interpretations where, as here, the
precedent rejected is "fundamentally flawed", and of
course especially where, again as here, the precedent
acts as "a positive detriment to coherence and
consistency in the law . . . because of inherent
confusion created by an unworkable decision". In
recent years, our cases have produced such
inconsistency largely because we have failed to
identify a clear definition of the term "use" of a
firearm; it is that failure that has led to our frequent
second-guessing ofjuries. In attempting to mend the
incoherence of our previous approach by articulating
a "proximity" plus "accessibility" test, however, the
court has in effect diluted "use" to mean simply
possession with a floating intent to use. In all but the
rarest case, then, a defendant will be subject to
punishment under §924(c) if guilty of a drug
trafficking offense and, while committing the offense,
was in possession of a firearm. I think the wording,
history and context of §924(c) call for a different
bright-line rule-one requiring active "use" rather than
possession with a contingent intent to use.
The majority asserts that a gun placed in one's
drawer with an intent to use it in the event of an
intruder is, "in common parlance, [ ] a gun 'used' for
domestic protection". This is possible in some
contexts, but they are contexts in which the fact of
"use" is assumed. Q: "What do you use the gun for?"
A- "I use it to protect my family." In that hypothetical
the answerer accepts the questioner's premise that the
gun is in some sense used. But as the question
assumes something that is not established, the
answerer might well go back to the premise: A:
"Actually, I've never had to use it. I keep it here in
case of an intruder."
While the majority attempts to fine-tune the
concept of facilitation (and thereby, use) through its
twin guideposts of proximity and accessibility, the
ultimate result is that possession amounts to "use"
because possession enhances the defendant's
confidence. Had Congress intended that, all it need
have mentioned is possession. In this regard, the
majority's test is either so broad as to assure automatic
affirmance of any jury conviction or, if not so broad,
is unlikely to produce a clear guideline. Thus, if the
new standard proves anything less than a carte
blanche for conviction, it will lead to the same sort of
continuous and vacillating review ofjury verdicts that
our past jurisprudence has yielded and that the court
so rightly deplores.
Under my view of "use" there can be no serious
argument that either Robinson or Bailey "used" the
weapons as to which they were charged under
§924(c). But Bailey plainly transported his firearm in
the trunk of his car, and the jury in his case was
instructed to find whether the defendant had "used or
carried" the weapon. Thus the question arises whether
transportation of a firearm under these circumstances
can sustain a conviction for carrying a firearm.
I do not believe §924(c) can properly be extended
from these situations to that of the defendant who, like
Bailey, transports the weapon in his car but is not
shown to have had immediate access at any time while
he was committing his drug trafficking offense. The
effect would be to have §924(c) embrace virtually
every instance where a drug trafficker transports a
weapon; in view of Congress's provision of a separate
penalty in an adjacent section for anyone who
"transports" a weapon with intent to commit a crime
punishable by as much as a year's imprisonment, that
seems an improbable duplication. Rather, consonant
with an active notion of "use", with the Senate
Report's example of a weapon carried in the
defendant's pocket, and with the principle of the
"constructive possession" cases that the defendant may
use the gun on a moment's notice, the word "carry"
must entail immediate availability. Thus, the gun
locked in the trunk of Bailey's car was not accessible
enough to support a conviction for carrying the gun
during and in relation to his possession with intent to
distribute drugs.
That is not to say that a defendant arrested with a
gun in his trunk may never be convicted under
§924(c). Realistically, drug dealers often operate out
of car trunks, returning from a distribution station to
replenish drugs, deposit cash or retrieve a weapon. If
the government presents evidence that the defendant
handled the weapon by placing it in the car "during
and in relation to" action taken in the commission of
a predicate offense, that evidence would be sufficient
to sustain a conviction. Alternatively, there may be
cases where the government can prove that the
defendant bought the firearm such a short time before
arrest on the drug trafficking offense as to sustain an
inference (beyond a reasonable doubt) that he must
have been handling it simultaneously with
commission of the drug offense. But as a gun can
obviously rest in a trunk for a long period, the mere
fact of a gun's presence there, coupled with the
defendant's use of the car for drug distribution, does
not give nse to an inference of the necessary
simultaneity of immediate access to the weapon (in a
context of moving it about) and commission of the
predicate crime. As there appears to be no evidence in
the record against Bailey beyond his drug trafficking
and the location of the weapon in the trunk, his
conviction cannot be sustained on such a ground.
The majority's expansive view of "use" virtually
emasculates the role of the term "carry" in the statute.
If "use" is understood to require real activity (such as
brandishing, displaying or threatening), and "carry" to
require conveying the firearm, coupled with immediate
ability to put it to active use, both terms will have a
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meaningful yet distinct content, consistent with the
language, context and legislative history of §924(c).
I would reverse the convictions of both Bailey and
Robinson.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
[Omitted.]
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94-1861 MUSQUIZ v. U.S.
Right to silence-Admissibility of defendant's
post-arrest, pre-warnings silence.
Ruling below (CA 5, 45 F.3d 927, 56 CrL
1485):
Circuit precedent downplaying probative value
of accused's silence during period after arrest but
prior to receiving warnings prescribed by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is
undermined by subsequent opinions of U.S. Su-
preme Court, including Brecht v. Abrahamson,
61 LW 4335 (1993), and Fletcher v. Weir, 455
U.S. 603 (1982), which indicate that silence dur-
ing this period can be highly probative; probative
value of evidence of defendant's failure, after his
arrest but before Miranda warnings, to come
forward with his exculpatory explanation for his
attempt to gain entry to car loaded with cocaine
outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice, and
its admission at defendant's trial did not violate
Fed.R.Ev. 403.
Question presented: When proof of defendant's
silence after arrest is offered against him, does it
make any difference whether silence came before
or after Miranda warnings for purposes of consti-
tutional protection, exercise of court's supervisory
power, or balancing test prescribed by Rule 403?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/12/95, by
Michael Ramsey, of Houston, Texas.
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PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge
Robert Martinez Gatewood and Gilbert Martinez
Musquiz appeal their criminal convictions on cocaine
charges, urging that their conduct was misread--they
were not dealing but trying to collect DEA reward
money by turning in drug dealers. The main issue
now is whether the trial court should have allowed the
prosecutor to cross-examine Musquiz about why he
failed to offer this explanation and instead remained
silent after he was arrested and before receiving
Miranda warnings. We hold that the questions were
permissible, reject other contentions, and affirm.
II.
Defense counsel by a motion in limine asked the
court to instruct the prosecutor not to question
Musquiz about his silence in the interval between
arrest and Miranda warnings. The trial judge denied
the motion. Musquiz testified on direct examination
that he was just trying to earn a reward for turning in
drug traffickers. The prosecutor cross-examined
Musquiz about his not offering this explanation when
he was arrested.
Musquiz relies on United States v. Henderson.
Henderson turned on the balance to be struck between
probative value and prejudice under the rules of
evidence. Henderson, a prisoner, was sle- when
searched for marijuana. Miranda warnings came after
the search. After Miranda warnings, Henderson gave
his explanation, the same explanation he offered at
trial. The court held it was reversible error to attack
Henderson's explanation by stressing in closing
argument his silence when confronted by officials.
The panel concluded that the comment was highly
prejudicial and lacked significant probative value,
since Henderson's silence was consistent with his
explanation at trial. Concluding that on these facts the
prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value, the
panel reversed Henderson's conviction. Henderson
and Impson, on which it relied, reflect hostility toward
prosecutorial use of a defendant's silence. That
hostility seems to have flourished against the
backdrop of an expansive vision of a defendant's
rights under the Fifth Amendment, although the
opinions do not offer that explanation. Whatever the
source, it found expression both in their balancing of
prejudice and probative value and in the absence of
deference given the trial court's ruling. Laying aside
the correctness of the appellate role they implicitly
assume, these decisions yield no ruling or holding
binding on later panels of this court. Rather, they are
case specific and fact bound. We would be consistent
with Henderson and Impson in our holding today even
if the legal matrix in which the balance is to be struck
had not changed. It has.
The Supreme Court and other courts of appeals
do not, at least now, share the Henderson panel's
unwillingness to give much, if any, weight to the
probative value of a defendant's silence. Indeed,
Henderson and Impson refused to recognize the
difference between silence before a Miranda warning
and silence after a defendant has been told that he may
remain silent and his silence will not be used against
him. This worked an extension of Miranda 's bite by
giving silence little, if any, probative value and
blurring the distinction between silence before and
silence after a Miranda warning.
Since Henderson, the Supreme Court, using the
same framework of probative value and prejudice, has
recognized that "[sluch [post-arrest, pre- Miranda ]
silence is probative." It has distinguished
post-warning silence, holding that a Miranda warning
that a suspect need not make a statement makes the
use of silence both unfair and unreliable because the
warnings "induce[ I silence by implicitly assuring the
defendant that his silence [will] not be used against
him." Indeed, the Court has found that pre- Miranda
silence can be highly probative precisely because it
implicates no such assurances.
We cannot agree then with Musquiz's contention
that Henderson laid down a prophylactic ban on
admission of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence or that
its holding rested on federal supervisory power. The
reality is that Henderson 's weighing came at the high
mark of Miranda's reach, a reach later shortened by
the developing Miranda doctrine.
On these facts, a reasonable juror may have
supposed that Musquiz would have explained when
confronted by the police if he was in fact trying to
assist the police in catching drug dealers. The district
court acted well within its discretion in allowing the
cross-examination. Given the deference due the trial
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court ruling, we cannot conclude that the probative
value of Musquiz's silence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We find
no error in the admission of this evidence. In doing so
we announce no broad rule of evidence. The
admission of evidence that a defendant remained silent
on arrest and before a Miranda warning turns on fact
specific weighing by the trial judge.
AFFIRMED.
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94-1993 HALL v. U.S.
Search and seizure-Commercial curtilage.
Ruling below (CA 11, 47 F.3d 1091, 57 CrL
1063):
Assuming that "commercial curtilage" is
meaningful Fourth Amendment concept, occu-
pant of business property must take affirmative
steps to bar public from area to render that area
private; fact that public is not invited into area is
not relevant to determination of whether area is
within commercial curtilage; facts that company
shredded documents, placed them in garbage
bag, and placed bag in closed dumpster on busi-
ness property demonstrated only that company
had subjective expectation of privacy in docu-
ments; company had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in shredded documents that was violated
when police officer drove up unmarked private
business driveway and removed documents from
dumpster in parking area; company chairman's
conviction of illegally selling restricted military
parts to Iran on basis of evidence contained in
shredded documents is affirmed.
Question presented: Has Eleventh Circuit erro-
neously decided important question of federal
constitutional law regarding applicability of
"commercial curtilage" concept that has not
been, but should be, settled by this court?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/6/95, by Joel
Hirschhorn, of Coral Gables, Fla.
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In February, 1993, ajury convicted Terrence Hall,
chairman of Bet-Air, Inc., a closely held Miami-based
seller of spare aviation parts and supplies of fourteen
counts of violating various federal laws in connection
with Bet-Air's sale of restricted military equipment
parts to Iran. After conviction, the district court
sentenced Hall to a prison term of fifty-one months.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August, 1990, a federal grand jury in the
Southern District of Florida returned a fourteen count
indictment against Hall and several codefendants. In
April, 1991, Hall moved to suppress all evidence
derived from the warrantless search of the garbage
dumpster and all evidence seized during the search
pursuant to a warrant of the Bet-Air premises. The
magistrate judge found that Bet-Air had a
"substantially reduced expectation of privacy in the
roadway and surrounding area, including the garbage
dumpster" and, therefore, recommended that the
motion to suppress be denied. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. Following a jury trial. Hall was
convicted as charged on all counts of the indictment
and sentenced to a term of fifty-one months
imprisonment as to each of the fourteen counts, the
sentences to run concurrently with each other. Hall
appeals.
ISSUES
In this appeal, Hall raises the following claims:
(1) the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress documents and records seized pursuant to the
execution of a search warrant where the probable
cause for the warrant was obtained through a
warrantless search of a dumpster located in Bet- Air's
"curtilage"; (2) the prosecutor's closing remarks were
improper and prejudicial; and, (3) the district court
improperly exercised its sentencing discretion in
applying the Sentencing Guidelines to a
pre-Guidelines case.
CONTENTIONS
Hall contends that Bet-Air had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the shredded documents. He
argues that Bet-Air took at least four affirmative
measures to safeguard its privacy interest in the
documents: the documents were shredded; the
documents were sealed inside a green garbage bag;
the green garbage bag was placed inside an enclosed
garbage dumpster; and the garbage dumpster was
within the "commercial curtilage" adjacent to Bet-Air
offices forty yards from public property. Hall also
argues that Parks's entry onto Bet-Air's premises
constituted unauthorized entry onto private property.
The government contends that Bet-Air's
subjective expectation of privacy in its garbage was
not objectively reasonable because the company did
not take steps to limit the public's access to the
dumpster. Additionally, the government contends that
at the time of the entry, Agent Parks believed the road
leading to Bet-Air's premises to be a public road.
DISCUSSION
A. Suppression Motion
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court
held that a warrantless search and seizure of garbage
left in a plastic bag on the curb in front of, but outside
the curtilage of, a private house did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The Court, relying on Katz v.
United States, held that such a search would only
violate the Fourth Amendment if the persons
discarding the garbage manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in their garbage that society
accepts as objectively reasonable.
As support for his assertion that Bet-Air's
expectation of privacy in its discarded garbage was
objectively reasonable, Hall points to the fact that
Parks obtained documents that were shredded, then
placed inside a green garbage bag, which was in turn
placed inside a garbage dumpster. We believe that the
manner in which Bet-Air disposed of its garbage
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serves only to demonstrate that Bet-Air manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in its discarded
garbage. Whether Park's actions were proscribed by
the Fourth Amendment, however, turns on whether
society is prepared to accept Bet-Air's subjective
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tihe right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. . . ." It is well established that the Fourth
Amendment protections apply to commercial
premises. "The businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about his
business free from unreasonable official entries upon
his private commercial property." The Fourth
Amendment, moreover, "protects people, not places."
Thus, whether the Fourth Amendment's protections
are invoked to protect the sanctity of the home or of
commercial property, the touchstone of the inquiry
into the objective reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy is whether the governmental intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values the
Fourth Amendment protects.
The fact that the test of the legitimacy of an
expectation of privacy is the same in both the
residential and commercial sphere does not mean,
however, that the factors which tend to be of probative
value in resolving the inquiry when the governmental
intrusion involves a residence, are to be accorded the
same weight when the inquiry is directed at the
legitimacy of a privacy expectation in commercial
property. The Supreme Court's treatment of the
expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial
property enjoys in such property has differed
significantly from the protection accorded an
individual's home. Such distinctions are inevitable
given the fumdamental difference in the nature and
uses of a residence as opposed to commercial
property. These distinctions are drawn into sharp
focus when, as in this case, the government intrudes
into the area immediately surrounding the structure.
In order for persons to preserve Fourth Amendment
protection in the area immediately surrounding the
residence, they must not conduct an activity or leave
an object in the plain view of those outside the area.
The occupant of a commercial building, in contrast,
must take the additional precaution of affirmatively
barring the public from the area. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that the government is required
to obtain a search warrant only when it wishes to
search those areas of commercial property from which
the public has been excluded.
Whether Bet-Air's subjective expectation of
privacy was objectively reasonable, that is, whether
Park's actions infringed on any societal values the
Fourth Amendment protected, requires, we believe, an
inquiry into the nature of the privacy interest asserted
and the extent of governmental intrusion. The
Supreme Court's teachings in Greenwood will guide
our inquiry.
Relying on the fact that the dumpster was within
the "commercial curtilage" of Bet-Air's property and
that it could only be accessed by traveling forty yards
on a private road, Hall asserts that the company's
subjective expectation of privacy was objectively
reasonable. Hall's argument has two parts: Parks's
trespass onto private property and the dumpster's
proximity to Bet-Air's offices.
The dumpster's location on Bet-Air's private
property does not contribute significantly to a finding
that the company's expectation of privacy was
objectively reasonable. Hall's heavy emphasis on
Parks's trespass onto Bet-Air's private property is
misplaced. The law of trespass forbids intrusions
onto land that the Fourth Amendment would not
proscribe. We note that although the road leading to
Bet-Air's dumpster was private, the magistrate judge
found that no "objective signs of restricted access such
as signs, barricades, and the like" were present.
Moreover, the magistrate judge also found that at the
time Parks travelled the road, he believed it was a
public road. Hall has not come forth with any
evidence disputing Parks' assertion. We also note that
the Supreme Court has long since uncoupled the
application of the Fourth Amendment's protections
from the common law doctrine of trespass. The
Fourth Amendment's reach does not turn upon the
mere presence or absence of physical intrusion into an
enclosure. "The existence of a property right is but one
element in determining whether expectations of
privacy are legitimate."
As we noted earlier, the owner of commercial
property has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those areas immediately surrounding the property only
if affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the
public. Greenwood, moreover, demonstrates that one
indicator of the objective reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy in discarded garbage is the
degree to which persons expose their garbage to the
public. We do not read Greenwood as measuring the
degree of exposure only through reference to that
which is in plain view. In Greenwood, the Supreme
Court considered the extent to which the public had
been afforded access to the discarded trash.
Admittedly, the Court, in Greenwood, was not faced
with an intrusion onto private property. As we have
already demonstrated, however, the probative value of
the fact that the dumpster was located in the area
immediately surrounding Bet- Air's property is
substantially attenuated due to the lack of any
evidence that Bet-Air took steps to exclude the public.
Hall argues that the government has not demonstrated
that the general public was invited onto Bet-Air's
private property. We do not believe this is the
appropriate inquiry when an expectation of privacy is
asserted in the area immediately surrounding a
commercial building. Rather, the Supreme Court has
consistently stated that a commercial proprietor has a
reasonable expectation of privacy only in those areas
where affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the
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public. This failure to exclude the public takes on
increased significance when the asserted expectation
of privacy is in discarded garbage. The common
knowledge that garbage left on the side of a public
street is "readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops and other members of the public"
renders an expectation of Fourth Amendment
protection unjustified. A commercial proprietor incurs
a similarly diminished expectation of privacy when
garbage is placed in a dumpster which is located in a
parking lot that the business shares with other
businesses, and no steps are taken to limit the public's
access to the dumpster. It is common knowledge that
commercial dumpsters have long been a source of
fruitful exploration for scavengers.
Hall's other arguments in support of the objective
reasonableness of Bet-Air's expectation of privacy are
unpersuasive. They can be reduced to the assertion
that the dumpster was located within the "commercial
curtilage" of Bet-Air's property and that a private
garbage collection company collected the garbage.
'"The curtilage concept originated at common law
to extend to the area immediately surrounding a
dwelling house. . . ." The concept of curtilage plays a
part in determining the reach of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. The Supreme Court used
the concept of curtilage in Hester v. United States, to
distinguish between the area outside a person's house
which the Fourth Amendment protects, and the open
fields, which are afforded no Fourth Amendment
protection. In general, the curtilage is defined as the
area around the home which "harbors those intimate
activities associated with domestic life and the
privacies of the home."
Whether the Fourth Amendment protects privacy
interests within the curtilage of a dwelling house
depends on four factors: (1) the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the home; (2) the nature of
the uses to which the area is put; (3) whether the area
is included within an enclosure surrounding the home;
and, (4) the steps the resident takes to protect the area
from observation. The Supreme Court has not
squarely addressed the applicability of the common
law concept of curtilage to commercial property.
Given the Court's view of the relationship between the
Fourth Amendment and commercial premises,
however, we have little doubt that were the Court to
embrace the so-called "business curtilage" concept, it
would, at a minimum, require that the commercial
proprietor take affirmative steps to exclude the public.
Such a requirement is apparently foreordained through
a long line of case beginning with See v. Seattle. In
light of Bet-Air's failure to exclude the public from the
area immediately surrounding its offices, we refuse to
apply the so-called "business curtilage" concept in this
case.
Accordingly, we do not believe that Parks
infringed upon any societal values the Fourth
Amendment protects when he searched Bet-Air's
garbage. Bet- Air did not take sufficient steps to
restrict the public's access to its discarded garbage;
therefore, its subjective expectation of privacy is not
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.
CONCLUSION
We find no error in the district court's denial of
the suppression motion and the imposition of
sentence, nor do we find any impropriety in the
prosecutor's closing statements. Accordingly, Hall's
convictions and sentences are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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94-1691 NEW YORK v. SPENCER
Search and seizure-Vehicle stops-Stop to ask
driver whereabouts of suspect.
Ruling below (NY CtApp, 84 N.Y.2d 479, 622
N.Y.2d 483, 56 CrL 1385):
Police officers conducted unreasonable stop in
violation of Fourth Amendment when, acting
upon victim's suggestion that particular motorist
she had just seen would likely know whereabouts
of man who she said assaulted her, officers
stopped motorist to ask about suspect's where-
abouts; plastic bag of marijuana illuminated by
officers' flashlights as they queried defendant and
firearm seized during later search should have
been suppressed at defendant's trial; defendant's
convictions of drug and firearms offenses are
reversed.
Question presented: Did police officers act rea-
sonably when they stopped automobile solely to
ask driver location of armed violent felony sus-
pect, who had been seen in immediate vicinity
several minutes earlier, in case in which officer
had reasonable cause to believe that suspect's
whereabouts were known to driver of automobile?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/17/95, by
Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty. for Kings Cty.,
N.Y., Roseann B. MacKechnie, Victor Barall,
Anthea Bruffee, and Jonathan Frank, Asst. Dist.
Attys., and Valerie DePalma, Legal Asst. to Dist.
Atty.
94-1666 FREDERICK v. VIRGIN ISLANDS
Search and seizure-Inevitable discovery doc-
trine-Impeachment-Jury instructions.
Ruling below (CA 3, 12/16/94, unpublished):
Court affirms, without comment, defendant's
convictions of murder and related offenses.
Questions presented: (1) Has "inevitable dis-
covery" rule ended Fourth Amendment's require-
ment that law enforcement officers procure war-
rant before conducting search of private home?
(2) Did trial court err by allowing prosecution to
use evidence, which had been illegally seized and
suppressed, on its cross-examination of defendant
when that evidence was not brought out by de-
fense on his direct or cross-examination? (3) Is it
plain error for trial court to give incomplete jury
charge on burden of proof element of affirmative
defense of excusable homicide, under Virgin Is-
lands law?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/11/95, by Mark
L. Milligan, Gordon C. Rhea, and Alkon, Rhea
& Hart, all of Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I.
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DUI POLICY MAY RUN INTO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
USA Today
Copyright 1995
Wednesday, June 21, 1995
Tony Mauro
More and more states are hitting
drunken drivers with a one-two legal
punch: suspend their licenses immediately,
then try them on criminal charges later.
But judges in 18 states have balked at
the approach, setting aside the convictions
of more than 1,000 defendants - including
singer John Denver - on the grounds that
the one-two punch amounts to "double
jeopardy."
Double jeopardy, barred by the Bill of
Rights, refers to double punishment for the
same crime.
In some jurisdictions in Idaho and
Virginia, police have reportedly stopped
confiscating licenses of alleged drunken
drivers because some local judges have
reversed convictions on double jeopardy
grounds.
"You have the crazy situation where it
depends on what courtroom you are in
whether it's double jeopardy or not," says
Fairfax County, Va., Commonwealth's
Attorney Robert Horan Jr.
So far, the double jeopardy argument
has not been upheld on appeal, but legal
experts say the issue may have to be settled
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Lawyers for accused drivers say they
are making a valid - even if unpopular -
constitutional claim.
"I know it's a hard sell," says Robert
Chestney, an Atlanta lawyer who has
challenged several convictions on
double-jeopardy grounds. "It's a popular
notion to punish drunk drivers, even if
they're punished twice."
Laws in 38 states allow for the
immediate suspension of licenses for up to
90 days following arrest, encouraged in
part by a federal law that ties the
distribution of highway funds to passage of
tougher drunken-driving laws.
The wave of reversals was triggered by
a series of seemingly unrelated Supreme
Court rulings that restrict the ability of law
enforcement officials to seize the assets and
property of accused drug offenders. The
asset forfeitures were viewed by the court
as punishment separate from the criminal
proceedings, and now lawyers for accused
drivers argue that the suspension of drivers'
licenses should be viewed the same way.
"In some courts, convictions are being
thrown out 10 and 20 at a time," says Long
Beach, Calif. lawyer Lawrence Taylor, who
developed the double-jeopardy argument.
"It has been courageous for some of these
judges to keep the Constitution in mind."
But Fairfax County's Horan says
license suspension is aimed at "protecting
the safety of the general public. A license is
a privilege, not a right, so taking the license
is not part of the punishment."
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SINGER'S DUI SONG FALLS FLAT FOR OTHERS
Denver Post
Copyright 1995
Saturday, July 1, 1995
Howard Pankratz
Denver Post Legal Affairs Writer
A dozen Denver motorists, employing what had
been a successful legal argument for singer John Denver,
were told yesterday that what worked for the recording
star doesn't work for them.
Wading into a national legal debate, Denver County
Judge Arthur Fine nuled that the 12 can be prosecuted on
drunken-driving charges even though their driving
privileges have already been revoked administratively.
The judge said that both prosecuting and yanking the
license of someone accused of driving drunk does not
constitute "double jeopardy" or "double punishment" for
the same offense.
Fine, who handles drunken-driving cases, had
noticed 12 separate cases in which attorneys asserted the
"double jeopardy" claim. He heard the cases in one
session, then issued his ruling. With that decision, Fine
joined the sizzling debate over whether the loss of a
license plus criminal prosecution subjects drivers to
unconstitutional double punishment.
The battle gained national media attention in March
when Pitkin County Judge Fitzhugh Scott III dismissed
a DUT charge against Denver.
The singer's attorneys - Walter Gerash, Todd
Thompson and Wally Prugh - argued that revocation of
a license is a severe form of punishment in today's
society. To have your license yanked and then be
criminally prosecuted, they said, amounted to double
punishment or double jeopardy.
Scott agreed.
The judge said that revocation of a license has a
highly punitive aspect to it. To try Denver criminally
would result in a second punishment, which would be
unconstitutional, said the judge.
Prosecutors contend that the administrative
revocation is remedial, not punitive. It is designed to
protect the nation's highways from irresponsible
motorists, they say.
Fine noted yesterday that losing a driver's license
can have a profound impact. "For the average person the
right to drive is of great importance and its loss is
disruptive of daily life," he said. But that doesn't amount
to "punishment" in the legal sense, he added.
The goal of the administrative revocation law, he
said, is to remove dangerous drivers from the road as
quickly as possible. "The social interest in providing for
safety on the streets and highways is a regulatory purpose
unrelated to criminal punishment," wrote Fine. "The
admittedly significant detriment to the defendant from
civil regulatory action - the "sting' - does not alone
establish "punishment'
"This (license revocation) statute is a stringent
regulatory measure," Fine added. "A misstep by a citizen
can trigger irreversible damage, unrelated to the outcome
of a criminal charge or even if no criminal charge is ever
filed."
Fine's decision was hailed by Lawson Willis, the
Aspen prosecutor who has taken John Denver to court
twice on charges of drinking and driving.
Denver was arrested Aug. 23, 1993, when an officer
saw his vehicle weaving down an Aspen street. His
blood alcohol level was 0.140, above the legal limit of
0.1. He later pleaded guilty to driving while impaired.
The second case occurred Aug. 21, 1994, after
Denver crashed his Porsche into a tree near Aspen.
Charges of driving under the influence and careless
driving were dismissed by Scott when he determined the
criminal case amounted to double jeopardy.
Denver's license was never suspended because a
hearing officer deternined that the blood drawn from
him for testing was not taken within the required two
hours.
The prosecutor, Willis, has appealed Scott's
decision.
Willis said that Fine's decision follows two
important rulings in other states, one by the Maine
Supreme Court, the other by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals.
Both cases, decided three weeks ago, upheld the
right of states to administratively revoke licenses and
criminally prosecute drivers.
Willis contends that these two decisions and a
myriad of lower court decisions in other states have
established a "clear trend" rejecting the double jeopardy
argument.
"The courts of magnitude - the appellate courts and
the Supreme Courts are not going along with this
double jeopardy argument," said Willis. "It is the very
isolated cases which are getting all the publicity. And all
of these isolated cases - at least to date anyway - are
getting reversed."
Wally Prugh, of the Gerash law firm, said many
decisions have gone the other way.
In Colorado, Scott of Pitkin County and Judge
William Fox of Fremont County have made such rulings,
he said. In addition, courts in Alaska, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina,
Virginia and Washington have said double jeopardy is
created by the situation.
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DRUNK DRIVERS CLAIM THEY ARE PUNISHED TWICE
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
Wednesday, June 21, 1995
Tommy Sangchompuphen
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
It sounds like a sure way to get the book thrown at
you: fail a Breathalyzer test when you're pulled over for
drunken driving.
But losing your license after failing a test can
actually get you off the hook in some states, where courts
have instituted a novel reading of the Constitution's
prohibition against double jeopardy. In those states, if a
driver's license is automatically suspended after he or she
fails a test, judges have ruled that the driver can't face
criminal charges too. That, they say, would be two
prosecutions for the same crime.
"If the state wants to take a shot at you, it can, but
don't do it twice," says Lawrence Taylor, a Long Beach,
Calif., lawyer who defends alleged drunken drivers and
teaches the double-jeopardy defense to other lawyers.
State governments have been getting around this by
calling license suspensions administrative proceedings,
Mr. Taylor says. But "that's a double punishment no
matter what it's called."
So far, trial courts in 18 states have ruled for the
double-jeopardy argument in drunken-driving cases. But
the question may ultimately be settled by the Supreme
Court because states are appealing and, so far, winning
their appeals, lawyers say. "Right now it seems as though
there are a number of courts which have decided on both
sides of the issue," says Jesselyn McCurdy, staff attorney
for the National Traffic Law Center at the American
Prosecutors Research Institute in Alexandria, Va.
The highest courts in five states -- New Mexico,
Maine, Hawaii, Vermont and Louisiana -- have upheld
the states' right to suspend a driver's license and
subsequently prosecute the driver for drunk driving.
In the Maine case, the defendant, John Savard, a
23-year-old office manager for a real-estate appraisal
company, had his license suspended after failing a
Breathalyzer test. Mr. Savard's lawyer tried to have
criminal charges dismissed, saying that any criminal
punishment would amount to double jeopardy. The trial
court agreed and threw out the charges against Mr.
Savard. But the Maine Supreme Judicial Court overruled
the trial court earlier this month.
If convicted, Mr. Savard, a first-time offender, faces
a maximum fine of $500 and some community-service
work. (Criminal penalties for first-time offenders who
drive under the influence of alcohol or with a
blood-alcohol level of 0.10% -- or 0.08% in some states
-- typically include fines, jail time or probation.)
Meanwhile, the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the
Arizona Court of Appeals last week reversed trial-court
decisions that said license suspensions are "punishment"
and violate double-jeopardy protection. The Minnesota
appellate court ruled that license suspensions are
remedial and serve to protect drivers.
The Fifth Amendment's double-jeopardy clause was
designed to give the state one --and only one -- shot at an
accused criminal, says Rogers Smith, who teaches
constitutional law at Yale University. Otherwise,
exonerated defendants would live in continual fear of
being prosecuted again.
To show that double jeopardy has been violated in
drunken-driving cases, it is necessary to show that "the
government has in two separate proceedings imposed
two separate punishments," says John Junker of the
University of Washington School of Law. The issue of
double jeopardy, he says, can be avoided if both the civil
and criminal proceedings take place at the same time.
In all 50 states, statutes provide for the suspension
of the license of a driver who refuses to take a breath test,
in addition to possible subsequent criminal sanctions. In
37 states and the District of Columbia, laws call for the
immediate suspension or revocation of a license when a
driver fails a breath test, in addition to criminal
proceedings.
Some states whose trial courts have ruled in favor of
the double-jeopardy defense are temporarily modifying
their laws to avoid losing more cases while the decisions
are being appealed. Earlier this month, the Connecticut
Legislature voted only to suspend the licenses of
first-time offenders and to seek criminal prosecution only
for repeat offenders or for impaired drivers who injure or
kill other people, says John Bailey, chief state's attorney
for Connecticut. Other states have made similar moves.
Mr. Taylor and other defense lawyers point to two
precedents that lend credence to this new defense tactic:
the Supnreme Court's decision in Denartment of Revenue
of Montana vs. Kurth Ranch and a recent decision by the
Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.
In the 1994 Supreme Court case, the justices ruled
that prosecuting an individual for selling marijuana and
then civilly imposing a "marijuana tax" on the
individual's property under the state's Dangerous Drug
Tax Act constituted double jeopardy.
A Ninth Circuit appeals court panel, meanwhile,
ruled last September that the federal government's
practice of combining civil property forfeiture
proceedings and criminal sanctions in drug cases
violated the double-jeopardy clause.
But some legal experts contend that drunken-driving
cases are different.
"My own instinct is that usually a license revocation
is a remedial proceeding and not criminal punishment
and does not constitute double jeopardy," says University
of Chicago Law School Professor Stephen Schulhofer.
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